

Gendered Incentives, Party Support and Female Presidential Candidates

Forthcoming in *Comparative Politics*

Catherine Reyes-Housholder  
Postdoctoral Researcher, Fondecyt-Chile  
Associate Researcher, ICSO Universidad Diego Portales  
Adjunct Researcher, Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (COES)  
Tel: +56 9 6496 8767  
Robles 12977, Lo Barnechea  
Santiago de Chile  
[catherinehousholder@gmail.com](mailto:catherinehousholder@gmail.com)

Gwynn Thomas  
Associate Professor  
Department of Global Gender and Sexuality Studies  
University at Buffalo, State University of New York  
Tel. 716-449-0118  
1024 Clemens Hall  
Buffalo, NY 14260  
[gmthomas@buffalo.edu](mailto:gmthomas@buffalo.edu)

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### Abstract

Women hold less than 10% of chief executive positions worldwide. Understanding how women democratically access these posts requires theorizing how they gain resources from established parties to mount viable electoral campaigns. We argue that in stable regimes marked by representational malaise parties respond to gendered incentives and nominate female candidates. Drawing on Latin American cases, we show how diverse parties nominated women in order to signal change or novelty, to credibly commit to “feminine” leadership and issues, and to mobilize female voters. A negative case depicts how a lack of representational critiques can fail to incentivize parties to back women instead of men. Our focus on gendered incentives provides a new framework that places political parties at the center of questions about women’s electoral opportunities.

Women hold less than 10% of elected chief executive positions worldwide.<sup>2</sup> To understand how women win these posts requires theorizing how they first come to mount viable electoral campaigns. Women in Latin America increasingly have achieved this, receiving at least 20% of the vote and placing in at least third place twenty-two times between 1998-2018. Women also won the presidency in eight of those instances. This article maintains that a key step towards enhancing women's electoral viability is securing the support of parties with ample campaign resources. Why would these parties back women candidates in chief executive races?

This paper argues that certain representational challenges can motivate established parties to support women candidates. For the purposes of theorizing the importance of these resource-rich parties, this article conceptualizes "established parties" as parties or coalitions that have previously held the presidency, including those directly tied to a party or coalition that had won a previous election.<sup>3</sup> In nineteen of the twenty-two viable candidacies—and in the eight victorious cases—women's candidacies were backed by established parties. Specifically, we argue that in election cycles marked by deep dissatisfaction with political elites, established parties may throw their support behind a woman because female contenders are viewed as better at signaling change, credibly offering "feminine" leadership and issue advantages, and mobilizing female constituents. Thus, these gendered incentives can provide a crucial opening for female candidates to gain support from established parties, increasing their chances at both viability and victory.

We illustrate our gendered incentive argument with qualitative examinations of the electoral strategies and decision-making by established parties and candidates during the nomination process and campaigns for women candidates. We selected cases from the post-1998 period in Latin America where women made significant, but variable progress in

presidential competitions.<sup>4</sup> Our five “positive” cases of established parties nominating women vary at both the party level (ideology and nomination process) as well as at the country level (female legislators and developmental status). A “negative” case depicts how a lack of representational challenges provides fewer incentives for an established party to back a woman candidate. We draw on data from media sources, personal interviews, public opinion surveys, and scholarly research to support our argument.

Our analysis shows that established parties in Chile, Paraguay, Costa Rica, Brazil and Mexico all nominated women for president in part because they faced gendered incentives to address similar representational critiques. These challenges hinge on citizens’ fatigue with the ruling class, perceptions that parties are distant, out-of-touch and corrupt, and/or voter disaffection. Incumbent parties’ debates, discourses and strategies in each of these cases suggest these parties believed that specific women candidates could best signal change and novelty, credibly address citizen concerns—particularly corruption--and/or mobilize female voters. The analysis further reveals that the Uruguayan governing coalition, strategizing in a different representational context, faced few political incentives to support a female contender, and consequently, nominated another man for president over a female challenger.

Chief executive offices are considered the most powerful in the world, and men’s dominance in these positions cannot be explained or justified by their greater competence as leaders.<sup>5</sup> Some scholarship goes further to suggest that men’s tight grip on power undermines competition in excluding politically talented women, ultimately eroding the quality of governance.<sup>6</sup> Existing studies moreover show the rise of female chief executives can enhance democracy both in terms of women’s symbolic and substantive representation.<sup>7</sup> Normative considerations over improving democratic representation and

promoting equality drive research on how women come to govern their countries.

Understanding why established political parties' nominate women is a key, but overlooked, factor in explaining how women become chief executives both in Latin America and in other democracies.

This paper proceeds as follows. We first critique dominant explanations for female chief executives worldwide, pointing out that they cannot account for recent experiences in Latin America. Second, we examine the crucial role of the support of established parties in producing viable women presidential candidates (some of whom win). Third, we theoretically link these parties' context-specific challenges to the perceived benefits of female presidential candidates. Drawing on selected case studies, we then analyze the empirical evidence for our gendered incentive theory. Our conclusion re-iterates the paper's contributions to the burgeoning scholarship on female national leaders, clarifies the limitations of this study, and proposes avenues for future research.

## **1. Dominant Explanations and the Latin American Anomaly**

Existing global scholarship examines two sets of factors—the “who” and the “where”—to explain female chief executives. The “where” literature examines women's biographies, careers, and pathways and generally finds that both female and male national leaders are upper-class, highly educated, and politically experienced.<sup>8</sup> The “who” literature in turn argues that women more often than men leverage family ties to become presidents and prime ministers. Family ties are thought to provide women with the resources needed to overcome classic barriers and access office.<sup>9</sup> Much of the empirical support for these kinship theories comes from Asian experiences beginning in the 1960s.<sup>10</sup>

Scholars have criticized these arguments for focusing on women's but not men's relationships to powerful families, relying on broad definitions of political connections within the family, and failing to trace out causal mechanisms: family ties exist everywhere so why are some women able leverage them and others do not?<sup>11</sup> Global time-series analysis also concludes that family ties are diminishing in importance.<sup>12</sup>

Moreover, family ties can hardly explain Latin America's recent *presidenta* wave. Female presidents in Chile, Costa Rica, and Brazil clearly did not leverage connections to powerful families, but some have suggested that female presidents in Panama and Argentina did take advantage of marital connections.<sup>13</sup> Panamanian President Mireya Moscoso (1999-2004) was the widow of a previous president, Arnulfo Arias: they married after the military coup that sent him into political exile in the United States. However, Arias died in 1989, and Moscoso's presidential success is more proximately explained by her consolidation of the Arnulfista Party after her return to Panama in 1991. Her political work, rather than her marital relationship, directly furnished the resources and support that helped boost her to victory.<sup>14</sup>

Unlike Moscoso, Argentinian President Cristina Fernández chronologically followed her husband, Néstor Kirchner, into the presidency, but even her victories are not first and foremost explained by her marriage. Accounts of Fernández's political ascent tend to overstate Kirchner's role, thereby underplaying her own political genius.<sup>15</sup> Their political ambitions manifested around the time of their adolescent romance, and their careers remained intertwined until Kirchner's death in 2010. This suggests that even if Fernández—who commanded national power as a Senator prior to the presidency—benefited from marital ties, then Kirchner likely did as well. Moreover, the well-established Peronist Party, founded decades before Fernández and Kirchner were born, facilitated both

of their electoral victories. In short, even when family ties exist, they do not appear as the most decisive factor in explaining women's presidential victories in Latin America.

Another dominant body of research turns to the “where” in sorting out differences between countries that have and have not elected women chief executives. These studies find that globally women are less likely to become presidents than prime ministers, suggesting that the demands of personalistic, national campaigns impose additional barriers for women with presidential ambitions.<sup>16</sup> Additional findings are that women are more likely to win where executive power is either weak or divided, and to govern immediately after regime crises.<sup>17</sup>

Latin America's experience contradicts these “where” conclusions. The region's presidentialist regimes are considered some of the most powerful in the world.<sup>18</sup> Plus, democratic consolidation and strengthening rather than regime instability generally characterize the 1998-2018 period. No female president—not even a losing-but-viable female candidate (see Table 1)—has emerged during extreme political crisis, such as in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Latin America's experience thus necessitates new theoretical frameworks for understanding how women come to govern their countries.

## **2. Why Shift the Focus to Viable Campaigns and Established Parties?**

Two pre-requisite moves are needed to develop more robust understandings of female chief executives. The first involves focusing not just on victorious women, but also on women who forge viable campaigns but lose. A focus on what promotes women's viability is currently not part of the scholarship: influential small-n research from Europe compares only female winners.<sup>19</sup> Quantitative research usually obtains variation on leaders' sex, but consequently excludes women who almost won.<sup>20</sup> Medium-n global research that

does include unsuccessful female candidates groups together any kind of female candidate, thus not differentiating between viable and non-viable losers.<sup>21</sup>

Instead, we maintain that theorizing how women democratically access chief executive offices, particularly the presidency, requires taking one step back to understand how they emerge as serious contenders. Substantive reasons motivate this departure from current literature: achieving viability can prepare women for a future presidential win. Viability allows candidates to establish or solidify a national reputation, and it can help position them for a role either in the incoming administration, or as an opposition leader. This move also increases the number of “positive” cases available to study, a recurring methodological concern for research on female chief executives.<sup>22</sup> Past viability does not guarantee future success for a particular woman, but overtime, viable female candidacies help foster conditions necessary for other women to triumph: for example by motivating other women to run for office, by inspiring women’s political engagement, or by decreasing the gender bias faced by future women candidates.<sup>23</sup> A theory of relative success (viability) therefore precedes a theory of ultimate success (victory).

There are many possible ways to operationalize viability, and for the purposes of exposition, we define this as finishing in at least third place and obtaining at least 20% of the first round vote (see Table 1). Candidates in Latin America often are able to advance to the second round, when it exists, with vote percentages in the twenties. Our definition is retrospective, thereby omitting candidates who looked like serious contenders months or weeks before election day, but who then fell short once the votes were cast and counted.<sup>24</sup> Despite such limitations, Table 1 makes clear that expanding the focus to both winners and losing but viable non-winners shows that many women have demonstrated their past, current and potential power by coming close to victory. Women emerged as viable



presidential contenders 22 times in 11 countries. We therefore depart from the current literature by broadening the scope of our study to examine how women come to competitively contest—rather than specifically win—the presidency.

<INSERT TABLE 1>

From viability flows our second analytical move towards a more robust theory of female leaders: a close examination of political parties. Much extant scholarship discussed above downplays parties' significance, especially in the case of the presidency.<sup>25</sup> Yet, parties possess near-exclusive access to chief executive offices and thus are dominant actors even in weak party systems.

Yet not all parties are equally positioned to help propel women candidates to viability. Table 1 shows that 19 of the 22 viable candidacies—and all of the elected women presidents—emerged from parties or coalitions that have previously held the presidency or were directly tied to a party or coalition that had won a previous election, what we term established parties. To date, only three female candidates—Noemí Sanín in 1998, Marina da Silva in 2014, and Beatriz Sánchez in 2017—achieved viability as presidential candidates without the backing of such a party. Of these, only Sanín, an experienced political leader and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, created her own party to launch a viable candidacy. While parties that have not previously governed also nominate women, these parties are not yet launching women candidates towards either viability or victory.

Our focus on established parties probes this clear connection between women's viability and the support of established parties. Existing research shows that although parties in power still tend to nominate far fewer women than men, women presidential candidates were more likely than men to enjoy the backing of such parties during Latin

America's post-transition period.<sup>26</sup> Women candidates might particularly benefit from the backing of established parties because they can provide essential campaign resources—funding, organizational infrastructure and branding—that women lack more than men. For example, women tend to earn less personal income than men, and their marginalization from elite, male-dominated economic circles limits their access to alternative sources of campaign funding. Parties generally funnel money to presidential campaigns—regardless of the nuances in the formal and informal workings of campaign finance.<sup>27</sup> Second, women's historical marginalization means less access to the infrastructure and networks required to sustain competitive bids for the presidency. Established parties can provide this infrastructure, including personnel, technological capacity, and territorial organization.<sup>28</sup>

Finally, established parties can offer women branding resources. Women tend to enjoy less name recognition than men and greater doubts concerning their national leadership capacity.<sup>29</sup> Female presidential candidates confront greater obstacles in convincing voters of their ability to govern, especially since chief executives' responsibilities—such as implementing policy, managing bureaucracies, and defending national interests—hew more closely to stereotypically masculine leadership traits.<sup>30</sup> Piggybacking on party brands—including those of past or sitting male presidents—can help women establish national reputations and reassure voters that they can lead.

### **3. Incentives to Nominate Female Candidates for President**

The previous section maintained that clinching established parties' nominations can boost women's chances of competitively vying for the presidency. This paper now turns to its main research question: why would these resource-rich parties bet on female rather than male candidates? We argue that a constellation of representational challenges, which recur

in “malaised” contexts, can create specific incentives for these parties to support a female contender.

To start, scholars have documented uneven, but ongoing citizen dissatisfaction with Latin American political elites, sometimes vaguely referred to as “crises of representation.”<sup>31</sup> Research in this vein has identified within the region a sub-group of stable regimes where discontented citizens view parties as entrenched, distant, and corrupt.<sup>32</sup> In these “malaise” contexts, parties seek to: 1) signal change or novelty; 2) address citizen demands, especially around corruption; and 3) mobilize disenchanted voters.

Established parties operating in this political backdrop can view female candidates as better-suited than male candidates to deliver on each of these goals. To begin, women’s status as political outsiders historically has impeded their presidential ambitions. However, their gender’s ability to signal this outsider status can counter-intuitively benefit established parties that must justify continued rule to their constituents.<sup>33</sup> Women candidates often symbolize change by virtue of their gender, particularly in countries that have never experienced a female president.<sup>34</sup> Even if a female candidate chooses to downplay her gender’s novelty, the media often emphasize a “first woman” narrative in their coverage.<sup>35</sup> Women candidates therefore can allow established parties to embrace novelty and change on the campaign trail.

Second, citizens in malaise countries tend to view parties—particularly those with governing experience—as distant and unconcerned with their interests. In such contexts, associations between the female sex and “feminine” leadership attributes and issue competencies can motivate established parties to nominate a woman. Women’s leadership styles generally are stereotyped as more inclusive, horizontal, and oriented toward

dialogue.<sup>36</sup> Nominating a woman can also help parties appear more in tune with specific types of citizen demands. For example, issues such as social welfare, healthcare, and education may more closely align with stereotypically feminine rather than masculine issues such as national defense.<sup>37</sup>

Citizens in malaise countries tend to not only view established parties as out-of-touch, but also corrupt. Such critiques are usually gendered: men in politics are viewed as dishonest insiders while women are viewed as honest outsiders.<sup>38</sup> In 2012, 32.6% of Latin Americans said that men are more corrupt as politicians while just 4% said women are more corrupt.<sup>39</sup> Female presidential candidates therefore can help improve such parties' images and more credibly promise to clean up politics.<sup>40</sup> This provides an additional incentive for established parties in these political settings to tap a woman instead of a man.

Third, these parties' electoral strategies are shaped by another characteristic of malaise countries: declining partisan identification rates. Women tend to engage less politically,<sup>41</sup> and significant differences in rates of sympathizing and affiliating with parties between women and men date back to at least the mid-2000s.<sup>42</sup> Indeed, "the gender gap in party identification is evidence of the disconnect between women and parties in the region, and ....few factors seem to bridge that gap."<sup>43</sup> It follows that female candidates' perceived ability to more effectively target women, an electorally lucrative constituency, can help established parties in contexts of malaise achieve their voter mobilization goals.<sup>44</sup> These parties' goals do not seem to line up as well with women's perceived advantages where such parties' leaders and militants hear fewer or different complaints. Contexts where citizens appear relatively satisfied with political parties and leadership therefore fail to provide clear incentives for established parties to take a chance on nominating women.

#### 4. Party Case Selection

We have argued thus far that in malaise contexts, associations between the female sex and novelty, “feminine” leadership and issue advantages, and female mobilization can motivate established parties to break with tradition and nominate women for president. We support our argument about gendered incentives with evidence from five cases of established parties that decided to bank on female candidates (Chile 2005; Paraguay 2008; Costa Rica 2010; Brazil 2010; Mexico 2012). Each of these “positive” cases shows how the trio of representational challenges described above furnished gendered incentives to nominate women. Our negative case (Uruguay 2014) depicts how absent representational critiques, an established party lacked the incentives to support a woman contender.

<INSERT TABLE 2>

Within the positive cases, we leveraged the logic of “most different” case selection. Divergences in relevant party-level and country-level factors highlight the similar incentive structures operating in established parties. The positive cases first vary in terms of party ideology, which could help explain parties’ nominating decisions. Between 1998-2018, the left held more presidencies and tended to nominate and elect more women at the national level.<sup>45</sup> We therefore seek to demonstrate that the party incentives argument applies across the ideological spectrum: Bachelet and Rousseff were nominated by left-leaning parties while Chinchilla, Ovelar and Vázquez conservative ones.

Second, established parties’ propensities to back women may depend on variations in their nomination processes. This literature generally distinguishes between bottom-up and top-down driven processes, which not only differ across country, but also across parties and even over time within a single party.<sup>46</sup> Ovelar, Chinchilla, and Vázquez won contested, even bitter, primaries against prominent male leaders from the party. Neither Bachelet nor

Rousseff clinched their respective parties' nominations via formal primaries. Bachelet's rise in public opinion coincided with elite endorsements, suggesting a bottom-up and top-down consensus. In contrast, Rousseff's nomination was overwhelmingly driven by the backing of her party's leader and sitting president. We illustrate how gendered incentives matter across variations in parties' nomination procedures.

Moving to country-level factors, the quantity of female legislators can affect the likelihood of established parties' nominating women for president. Much research argues that as women's legislative presence increases, the pool of women with credentials to vie for the presidency deepens, augmenting the overall probability of electing a woman leader.<sup>47</sup> The percentages of female legislators in lower chambers averaged 22.7% in 2010 across Latin America. Two countries in our study exceeded that average (Costa Rica in 2010 with 36.8% and Mexico in 2012 with 26.2%) while three other countries fell below that percentage (Chile in 2005 with 12.5%; Paraguay in 2008 with 9%; Brazil in 2010 with 10%).<sup>48</sup> These discrepancies thus suggest that the pool of female legislators is a less relevant factor in explaining established parties' nomination of female presidential candidates.

Finally, these countries contrast in terms of developmental levels and overall population sizes. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development member Chile is the region's most economically advanced country while Paraguay is one of the region's least advanced. Brazil is the region's largest country with 210 million citizens while Costa Rica is one of the region's smallest with five million. The diversity of these positive cases across a range of factors grounds the explanatory power of our gendered incentives argument.

## 5. Building the Gendered Incentives Theory via Case Studies

Bachelet's Concertación nomination, Ovelar's primary win in the Partido Colorado, Chinchilla's PLN support, Vázquez's triumph in the PAN's internal elections, and Rousseff's PT backing virtually assured that each of these women would become their countries' first competitive woman candidate.<sup>49</sup> Securing an established party nomination in each of the positive cases boosted the electoral viability of the female candidate.

The relevant question thereby hinges on why these established parties decided to cast tradition aside and nominate a woman. For each case, we describe the representational challenges and lay out the evidence that established parties perceived—or at least had reason to perceive—that a female candidate could win support by: signaling change; promoting “feminine” advantages; and mobilizing female citizens. Our analysis proceeds chronologically, starting with Chile in 2005.

### *The Paradigmatic Case of Chile 2005*

Michelle Bachelet's first election marked the beginning of a Latin American wave of both viable and victorious female candidates. This case most clearly illustrates each component of our argument. Representational malaise imbues Chilean politics during this period.<sup>50</sup> The Concertación needed to be able to address representational critiques and justify continued rule despite citizen fatigue with party elites and a desire for new faces in the 2005 election. The coalition viewed Bachelet as a candidate who could symbolize change and novelty, offer “feminine” attributes and leadership, and successfully mobilize a core constituency of female voters.

The Concertación had won every presidential election since the 1989 transition to democracy. Through three successive governments, Concertación presidents had

strengthened democratic institutions, reformed the state, expanded public services, promoted economic growth, and decreased poverty. Opinion polls showed continued support for the Concertación's governing agenda.<sup>51</sup> However, multiple signs that the electorate was unhappy alarmed Concertación elites. Chileans were increasingly dissatisfied with political leadership, which they viewed as entrenched, out-of-touch, and tainted.<sup>52</sup> Ongoing scandals implicated Concertación leaders who looked worriedly at the rising electoral strength of conservative leaders, such as Joaquín Lavín. As a "change" candidate, Lavín had nearly won the previous 1999 election thanks to his self-branding as someone who cared about citizens' everyday concerns and his successful mobilization of female voters.<sup>53</sup>

In 2005, the Concertación responded to these challenges by banking on the advantages offered by a female presidential contender. President Lagos and other party elites publicly speculated that nominating a woman would demonstrate "change." Bachelet also skillfully leveraged gendered incentives. Despite her long history within the Socialist Party, Bachelet used her gender to discursively position herself as the "change" candidate, someone outside of the political establishment. Bachelet actively promoted the "first-female" framing of her candidacy, as did the general media, emphasizing her potential to break the highest glass ceiling in Chile.<sup>54</sup>

Second, party leaders could see that Bachelet offered specific "feminine" advantages, such as her ability to empathize and connect with citizens. Bachelet suggested in an interview that she performing well in the polls because "the population wants people who are close, kind, non-confrontational, who only confront when necessary."<sup>55</sup> She also campaigned on an unconventionally "feminine," leadership style that contrasted with her immediate predecessor's stereotypically masculine, authoritarian and paternal style.<sup>56</sup>



Bachelet's leadership was premised on associations between the female sex and greater dialogue, empathy, as well as democratic inclusions and citizen participation.

Bachelet thus presented herself as a "citizen candidate": close to the people and far from political elites. Months before the primary season, Bachelet led "citizen dialogs" and said she would create a platform by listening to constituents. For many, "the implication was that unlike the political parties, Bachelet cared about every-day citizens' demands."<sup>57</sup> Bachelet was consistently rated in national opinion polls as the most trusted candidate on the stereotypically feminine issues of healthcare, education and poverty—and each of these issues gained saliency in the Chilean context of malaise.<sup>58</sup>

Party elites understood the Chilean electorate's demand for characteristics stereotypically associated with women, including moral leadership. Polls showed that Chileans sought leaders with personal integrity; 67% said honesty was the most important characteristic "to exercise (presidential) power in an exceptional way," and 62% chose "values and principles."<sup>59</sup> Another poll revealed that 76% believed some, most or all politicians were corrupt.<sup>60</sup> Forty-six percent said women were more honest while just 2% said men were more honest, and 36% believed women had more values and principles while only 2% believed this about men. Other polling indicated that Bachelet was perceived as less prone to corruption than her male competitors.<sup>61</sup>

Finally, Concertación elites gravitated toward Bachelet's candidacy in part due to the belief that her gender could enable her to better mobilize female voters, a demographic that had consistently provided more support for the center and right than the left. Bachelet began to cultivate a core constituency of female supporters on the basis of gender identity months prior to her official Concertación nomination, and she consistently polled better among women than her competitors. During the campaign, Bachelet met with women

voters, used her own experiences to create a form of gender solidarity, and promised pro-women change, most notably a gender parity cabinet. Political analysts correctly predicted that she would become the first center-left presidential candidate to mobilize more female than male voters, providing another incentive for Concertación leaders to back her bid.<sup>62</sup>

The strength of these incentives within the Concertación to nominate a woman can also be seen in that Soledad Alvear, the former Foreign Affairs Minister and Christian Democrat leader, was also considered a potential candidate and mounted an exploratory bid. The need for a primary between the two women within the Concertación was obviated when Bachelet's dominant position in public opinion polls prompted Alvear to gracefully bow out.<sup>63</sup> In short, Bachelet's candidacy provided the Concertación with an ability to signal change and novelty, credibly offer a "feminine" leader committed to everyday citizens and issues such as healthcare, anti-corruption and equality, and a new capacity to mobilize women voters.

#### *Rightist Party Incentives to Nominate a Woman: Paraguay 2008*

Juxtaposing Chile's Concertación and Paraguay's Asociación Nacional Republicana-Partido Colorado (known simply as Partido Colorado) in isolation highlights striking dissimilarities. The former governed a comparatively advanced economy from the center-left and the latter governed an agrarian-based economy from the right. Yet both established parties seeking to maintain power were positioned in comparable contexts of malaise and consequently faced a similar trio of incentives to nominate women for president: a desire for novelty, "feminine" issue competencies and attributes, and better mobilization of women voters.

As in Chile, Paraguay transitioned from dictatorship to democracy in the early 1990s and the Partido Colorado won every subsequent election until 2008.<sup>64</sup> This election cycle took place at the end of a period of relatively strong economic growth fueled by agricultural exports. Paraguayans nevertheless expressed increasing discontent with the ruling party.<sup>65</sup> Political corruption, concerns with clientelism, and a general desire for greater moral integrity in political leaders fueled growing voter fatigue with the governing party and representational malaise.<sup>66</sup> Thus, “the 2008 election was fought along simple lines and over basic issues. After six decades of Colorado rule, the time for change had arrived.”<sup>67</sup>

The Partido Colorado’s primary election hinged on debates over which candidate could offer the general electorate the most convincing “change” option. The party embraced the need to “renovate” and promote new leadership, while at the same time signaling to party members and elites continuity with the party’s policies. Two candidates emerged: former vice-president Luis Alberto Castiglioni and former Minister of Education and Culture Blanca Ovelar. Castiglioni drew upon his youth (age 46), and his training as an engineer to craft a discourse as a “rebel and modernizing” option.<sup>68</sup> Many Colorado leaders nevertheless believed that nominating a female candidate would better signal change and allow the party to maintain its hegemonic governing position. The support of sitting President Nicanor Duarte was crucial to Ovelar’s nomination. Duarte had tried to amend the constitution to enable him to run again. After failing, he threw his support behind his minister. Duarte publicly argued that one of Ovelar’s strengths was an ability to represent “revolutionary” change by virtue of her gender.<sup>69</sup> Ovelar was certified as the winner of a bitter primary with 45.04% (366,722 votes) against Castiglioni’s 44.5% (362,702 votes), with slightly over 50% of all registered members of voting.<sup>70</sup>

Ovelar's gender, which signaled both an "outsider" status as well as greater credibility on corruption issues, was a major plus given that the main opposition candidate in the general election was political outsider and former priest Fernando Lugo. Colorado leaders were watching Lugo consolidate an anti-Colorado coalition by railing against the ruling party's performance on corruption issues, arguing against the immoral practices of politicians, and promising growth and development with equity.<sup>71</sup> The Partido Colorado's assessment of the Lugo threat informed many of the party leaders' decision to back a woman. As one Colorado insider put it: "It entered into the calculation of...(President Duarte)...who was pushing for a candidacy that would be fought over novelty, progressive discourse, and audacity against the opposition alliance led by an outsider like the former bishop Lugo."<sup>72</sup> Ovelar could counter Lugo by leveraging positive gender stereotypes of women as honest and hard-working candidates. Ovelar strategically promised "...a strong and decisive fight against corruption."<sup>73</sup>

Additional evidence for the party's gendered incentives to nominate a female candidate comes from Ovelar's campaign rhetoric. She drew on her potential to become the country's first presidenta, her gendered emphasis on social issues, and her "outsider" status within the party as a technocrat (versus party ideologue).<sup>74</sup> She discursively tied her ability to "modernize" Paraguay through advances in gender equality and breaking with past "machista" political practices, including within her own party. She argued that her candidacy represented not only a "great innovation and a great change" from the patriarchal history of the Partido Colorado, but also a recognition of the need to confront the "historical debt that they must pay to the people."<sup>75</sup>

The Paraguayan example suggests another nuance in the change incentive, based on the association between a female candidacy and modernization. Ovelar's candidacy was

novel “not just in the fact of being a woman, but also because it symbolizes a definitive rupture with the past of prejudice and absurd discriminations....” President Duarte also used the same arguments to support Ovelar’s candidacy:

The nomination of Blanca Ovelar ... will really cement the Colorado Party as a political institution that is leaping a very long way towards a modernity that will leave behind 200 years of exclusion and discrimination against women. The Colorado Party would really spearhead an unprecedented process by nominating a woman...I am betting on a woman because the Colorado Party must offer a slate that raises hope – a revolutionary slate.<sup>76</sup>

Ovelar consistently employed a “first female” framing by playing up her ability to shatter her country’s highest glass ceiling.<sup>77</sup> She highlighted the historical potential of her candidacy, arguing that having a woman in Paraguay’s presidential palace, Palacio de López, would “radically” alter the country’s political history.<sup>78</sup> When asked what her candidacy meant, she emphasized her capacity to project change, make history, and to place Paraguay alongside their more developed and powerful neighbors by also electing a woman president.<sup>79</sup>

Like Bachelet, Ovelar also tapped into associations between the female sex and specific leadership competencies and styles in offering a more “human” way of governing. In interviews, she argued, “Inequality represents a political and ethical challenge that requires a more human look,” and, “Women, we come to humanize politics.”<sup>80</sup> She also highlighted her more inclusive leadership style. Indeed, her candidacy would be consonant with the emergence of new interest groups and identity groups:

There have emerged sectors, actors, minorities that for a long time were invisible in the eyes of the State. That new social reality, with new demands, requires a more comprehensive and wider look. I would say that it requires the look of a woman. Because of that, we propose change and I represent that alternative because for the first time a woman is going to be presidenta of this country.<sup>81</sup>

Finally, Ovelar sought to cater to female voters in her campaign and platform. Concrete proposals directed towards women (often in their roles as mothers) included: “monetary subsidies for housewives in humble conditions and those 60 years old or older”; “reduced tariffs for basic services for poor families that have a disabled child”; and to increase the number of families in extreme poverty enrolled in the conditional cash transfer Program Teko Porá from “50,000 to 150,000.”<sup>82</sup> More discursively, Ovelar promised to “...fight against discrimination”<sup>83</sup> and argued for the capability of Paraguayan women to act with “courage, with brilliance, with resolution, with patriotism and with honesty to lead the destinies of the patria.”<sup>84</sup> In short, Paraguay offers another example of an established party betting on female contender to capitalize on incentives related to change and novelty, “feminine” issues and leadership, and mobilization of women voters.

*Party Incentives in a Long-Standing Democracy: Costa Rica 2010*

Costa Rica differs from Chile and Paraguay in ways that support the generalizability of gendered incentives as motivating the support of established parties. Costa Rica is the region’s longest continual democracy with a well-developed party system and enviable levels of voter participation.<sup>85</sup> By the 2000s, however, it began to manifest malaise symptoms as traditional parties, the Partido Liberación Nacional (PLN) and the Partido

Unidad Social Cristiana (PUSC), struggled with growing citizen distrust, corruption scandals, and declining partisan identification. Costa Rican parties were critiqued as becoming simple electoral machines, dominated by individual leaders whose only goals were to elect deputies and preserve an increasingly insular group of political elites.<sup>86</sup> As in Chile, parties in Costa Rica were criticized for their inability to channel citizen participation and to develop programmatic responses to current social challenges.

These political problems shaped the PLN's strategic calculus as leaders debated whom to nominate for the 2010 race. Sitting president Óscar Arias was constitutionally prevented from seeking re-election. While Arias and the PLN remained fairly popular, corruption scandals and a divisive fight to secure approval of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) had damaged the party's standing. To hold onto presidential power, the PLN needed a candidate that could symbolize change and downplay these unpopular issues.

Many PLN leaders viewed Chinchilla's candidacy as a way to promote narratives of change and novelty and highlight the PLN's social welfare roots.<sup>87</sup> Arias was committed to promoting the candidacy of Chinchilla, his former vice-president, within the PLN and throughout Costa Rica. Arias heightened Chinchilla's profile by including her in more public activities and releasing her weekly schedule to the press. According to then Minister of Public Security, Fernando Berrocal, Arias said, "his successor should be a woman, that Costa Rica was ready for a woman and that Laura Chinchilla meets these conditions."<sup>88</sup> Arias announced publicly on International Women's Day in 2008 that he would like to hand over the presidential sash to a woman.<sup>89</sup> As Kevin Casas, who served as Arias' second vice-president with Chinchilla, noted "What was special about her candidacy is that she offered a combination difficult to possess; she assures the continuity of the work of this

administration, but she introduces a break in the political system, principally because she is a woman, and that is a very powerful message of change.”<sup>90</sup> Chinchilla easily won the PLN primary in 2009 against Johnny Araya, the then mayor of San José and nephew of former PLN president Luis Alberto Monge. Araya, given his long history and family ties in the party, had a harder time credibly promising change.

The PLN’s campaign strategy after nominating Chinchilla provides additional evidence of their belief in her gendered electoral advantages.<sup>91</sup> Chinchilla’s campaign slogans, such as “Laura firme y honesta” (Laura firm and honest), emphasized her distance from traditional political parties and highlight her individual moral integrity. This strategy sought to capitalize on both gendered stereotypes and Chinchilla’s own reputation as an honest politician, untouched by the corruption scandals plaguing other politicians.<sup>92</sup> Chinchilla also based some of her discourse on associations between the female sex, compassion and empathy in order to counter her parties’ support for neoliberal economic policies that threatened Costa Rica’s cherished social welfare state. To this end, she promoted the idea of a “red nacional de cuidado” (national care network) to protect the elderly and children, and she promised to expand the “Avancemos” (“Let’s Advance”) program of conditional cash transfers initiated by Arias to address rising poverty.<sup>93</sup>

Unlike Bachelet in 2005 and Ovelar in 2008, Chinchilla’s campaign did not explicitly highlight her “first-woman” status, but the media narrative around her campaign often stressed the ground-breaking nature of her candidacy. Chinchilla did explicitly mobilize women voters through appeals to gender solidarity. For example, one campaign ad by an opponent depicted Chinchilla as a marionette controlled by Arias, his brother Rodrigo Arias, and a shadowy figure, perhaps representing a narco-trafficker. Chinchilla responded by casting this advertisement as not just a personal attack, but as a broad assault on all



women's political abilities and indicative of a generalized lack of respect on the part of her male opponent towards women. Her response emphasized: “all women deserve respect.”<sup>94</sup>

To summarize, the same three incentives to nominate and back a woman candidate—signal change, better position the party on “feminine” issues, and more effectively mobilize women—help explain why the PLN supported Chinchilla. PLN leaders understood and, indeed, bet on the above-mentioned gendered advantages of Chinchilla, and Chinchilla campaigned on these issues. Chinchilla easily won the presidency in 2010, surpassing the vote of her PLN predecessor Arias.

*Tapping into “Feminine” Advantages Amid Corruption: Brazil 2010*

This presidential selection process again centered on an established party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), which was devising ways to maintain presidential power. Brazil in 2010 captures the tension between popularity and malaise: the PT was well-positioned to continue governing, in large part thanks to the enormous popularity of its leader Lula, but was also the most damaged by corruption.<sup>95</sup> The *mensalão* scandal, which involved accusations of vote buying, had cost some of Lula’s would-be male successors their jobs, namely former chief of staff José Dirceu. All of this suggests the PT may have gone with a male candidate in the absence of *mensalão*.

Given this challenge, Lula as the party’s undisputed leader began laying the groundwork for a female successor prior to the 2010 race. Multiple comparative advantages of a female candidacy inspired his strategy. A first-female framing appeared in campaign discourse in the case of Brazil, as it did in all the other positive cases.<sup>96</sup> PT politicians repeatedly hammered home the advantages of electing Brazil’s “first female” president. The PT Governor of Rio de Janeiro viewed Rousseff’s potential to become the country’s

first *presidenta* as a continuation of the radical change ushered in by the party that had elected the Lula. He declared that: “having a woman in the presidency...it is so good to see Brazil innovating after having a factory worker in the presidency.”<sup>97</sup> One PT senator said “I believe that every woman in this country is going to feel like the President of the Republic with a woman in the presidency.”<sup>98</sup>

The second kind of incentive dangling in front of party leaders relates to “feminine” advantages on corruption issues. Rousseff was seen as removed from the corrupt party establishment even though she had served as Lula’s Energy Minister and then chief of staff. She joined the PT in 2001, a relatively late date in her political career, and had never run for political office before vying for the presidency. Her relative distance from the male party establishment coupled with her gender enabled Rousseff to offer a squeaky-clean image.

The party’s marketing of Rousseff’s candidacy was deeply imbued with maternalism, generally associated with moral integrity in Latin America. Lula, Rousseff and her team emphasized her identity as a mother and a grandmother to highlight her “feminine advantages” on the campaign trail. Rousseff also linked her motherhood to her ability to manage personnel, a form of feminine leadership.<sup>99</sup>

The strategic design of the PT’s June 2010 convention provides additional evidence to bolster the centrality of gendered incentives. Campaign marketers staged the event around a “women” theme, which featured videos of well-known Brazilian women and “female attendees sat in a special place near the front of the stage and received lilac-colored flags.”<sup>100</sup> The convention’s slogan was “Patria Libre, Patria Mãe” (Free Homeland, Motherland). In short, these associations between her motherhood and moral integrity

seemed to enhance her appeal at least among some PT elites hoping to counter the party's reputation for corruption and to mobilize female voters.<sup>101</sup>

We close with evidence for the PT's motivations to galvanize female voters by nominating a female candidate. Lula had run as the PT's presidential candidate in every election since 1989, and he always had won fewer female than male votes.<sup>102</sup> Party leaders calculated that Rousseff, because of gender solidarity, could help expand its core constituencies by appealing to low-income women. Rousseff sought to build support among women voters by meeting with groups of women, emphasizing shared gender identities, and promoting pro-women reforms, which included improved maternal health care.<sup>103</sup> One of her first campaign acts targeted women union workers, and her campaign team created a "Women with Dilma" web site.<sup>104</sup> In sum, Rousseff's appeal to the PT benefited from gendered incentives around novelty, a "feminine" advantage on corruption issues and women's mobilization.

#### *Gendered Incentives to Bank Against the Return of the PRI: Mexico 2012*

Mexico presents the final example of an established party nominating a woman. The Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) ran Mexico for about 70 years until the Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN) democratically unseated the PRI in 2000. The PAN maintained presidential power with Felipe Calderón's successful 2006 bid. By 2011, the PAN was searching for innovative ways to maintain the presidency despite Calderón's growing unpopularity. As in our other cases, party elites were looking for ways to generate electoral support for a party facing representational challenges. As in the other cases, Vázquez and her party acted according to gendered incentives. First, Vázquez argued her candidacy represented positive, "feminine" change for the PAN and the entire country. One PAN

supporter said during Vázquez's campaign visit to Puebla that "all panistas in the country ... we are supporting Josefina Vázquez Mota because she is a woman of results, an honest person, with a trajectory, and very courageous, what Mexico needs to continue advancing."<sup>105</sup> Vázquez also emphasized her potential to break the highest glass ceiling, declaring, "I am going to be the first *presidenta* of Mexico."<sup>106</sup>

The "feminine" leadership and issue incentive was also in play. Corruption was a major issue in the election, and Vázquez marketed herself as a different, indeed more honest, politician who offered a consensus-based, feminine leadership style. Newspaper reports noted that she "based her pre-campaign on a message of hope and closeness to families and the popular classes, making her women's perspective valued before public affairs. Those who know her say that she knows how to listen and possesses a prudent and conciliatory spirit, facilitating agreements with other political forces."<sup>107</sup>

Finally, Vázquez consistently targeted women voters on the basis of gender identity, suggesting that she could help the PAN cultivate a core constituency of women.<sup>108</sup> Seeking to expand the PAN's female base, Vázquez promised pro-women reforms, including a responsible paternity law, full-time schools, and bank credits for entrepreneurial women. She also pledged in a women's forum to combat domestic violence and gender inequality in the workplace.<sup>109</sup> "I cannot stop talking about intrafamily violence that still affects many women, verbal violence, physical violence, psychological violence," Vázquez said at a clothing maquiladora. She went on to tap into women's comparative advantages as promoters of peace: "We urgently need a prevention agenda, an education agenda...and we need to support the victims of this violence. We cannot accept violence as part of our daily life."<sup>110</sup>

Vázquez also tried to court female voters by emphasizing women’s solidarity in overcoming adversity. “It has been 200 times harder for me than for a man to be on the ticket. Women, the more difficult it seems, the more we grow before adversity,” she said to female constituents.<sup>111</sup> She often campaigned alongside famous actresses, female politicians, and Calderón’s wife, first lady Margarita Zavala. Before a crowd of women supporters, she asked: “How are we going to win? We are half of the electorate and the mother of the other half,” continuing, “If women vote for Josefina Vázquez Mota we will have already won the Presidency.”<sup>112</sup> These efforts paid off electorally as Vázquez enjoyed a significant gender gap of women voters.<sup>113</sup> At one point female voters “outnumbered men by a fifth among her supporters,” suggesting that panistas were correct to view her candidacy as well-suited to appeal to women.<sup>114</sup>

The strength of the support of party elites and party activists for Vázquez can also be seen in her primary victory against two other male candidates, Ernesto Cordero and Santiago Creel, each representing opposing factions within the PAN. Vázquez won in the first round with 53.2% of the votes cast, almost 14% more than Cordero’s second place finish.<sup>115</sup> In short, Vázquez offered her party novelty, “feminine” issue competencies and leadership, and an effective appeal to female voters as the PAN faced daunting representational challenges.

#### *Different Representational Context Forecloses Female Ambitions: Uruguay 2014*

Our empirical section closes with an analysis of the lack of the emergence of a viable woman candidate in Uruguay despite key similarities. The governing Frente Amplio was not facing a comparable “malaise” context and strong representational critiques as our positive cases, and thus lacked the gendered incentives that helped push other established

parties to nominate a woman.<sup>116</sup> This negative case serves as a reminder of some of the classic difficulties that can hamper women's presidential ambitions, particularly the obstacles to penetrating male-dominated party networks.

In the early 2000s, Uruguay incorporated a new, left-leaning coalition with no major political crisis. The Frente Amplio's 2004 presidential victory democratically ended the Partido Colorado's and Partido Nacional's monopoly on presidential power. President Tabaré Vázquez subsequently ushered in progressive policy reforms.<sup>117</sup> He finished his term as the most popular president since the advent of polling in Uruguay. José Mujica easily won a second term for the Frente Amplio in 2009 and also earned high approval ratings.<sup>118</sup>

In the run-up to the 2014 elections, citizens, party militants and elites appeared relatively satisfied with their male leadership. Uruguay around this time had far lower numbers of self-reporting "defiant or angry" citizens: 73% in Chile vs. 26% in Uruguay.<sup>119</sup> We found no evidence of major broad critiques over corruption scandals, representational exclusion, or the insularity of political elites, factors that drove perceptions of "malaise" in the positive cases.

One female senator and her supporters nevertheless did try to mobilize around calls for new leadership.<sup>120</sup> Many within the Frente Amplio who were calling for generational change, gender equality or both were attracted to the prospective candidacy of Constanza Moreira, who had won her first senate race in 2009 and was hailed as a "new face in the Frente Amplio." About twenty years younger than Vázquez and Mujica, Moreira offered a younger and female alternative to the old guard. Many lauded her independence thanks to her public disagreements with male leaders.<sup>121</sup> Moreira supported abortion rights, which

Vázquez had vetoed in his previous administration, as well as reductions to the Armed Forces, greater income redistribution, and an integrated care system.<sup>122</sup>

Moreira nevertheless confronted daunting barriers to securing her coalition's nomination. Unlike in the positive cases, activists and elites in Frente Amplio were not prioritizing a candidate who could signal novelty, clean up politics, and mobilize women voters. Instead, the male political establishment saw her nomination as too much change.<sup>123</sup> Vázquez was the clear favorite within the coalition, and most believed he would easily win the next elections.<sup>124</sup> Moreira captured 18% of the Frente Amplio's primary vote on June 1, 2014, constituting the strongest performance of any female candidate in a primary contest.<sup>125</sup> Vázquez nevertheless topped her with an overwhelming 81%, surpassing Moreira in terms of resources and reputation. Mujica and his coalition backed their popular former president and boosted Vázquez to another victory in the general election.<sup>126</sup> Our analysis revealed little evidence to suggest that the coalition members perceived a political context where gendered incentives would provide electoral advantages to a woman candidate, present in each of this study's positive cases. Thus, Moreira did not benefit from a perceived need for novelty, "feminine" advantages, or female mobilization in her contest against Vázquez. Our gendered incentives argument nevertheless expects that if Uruguay faces a context of representational challenges, political parties could nominate a woman to capitalize on the gendered advantages observed in the positive cases.

## **6. Conclusions**

This paper makes multiple contributions to the burgeoning and normatively important literature on female chief executives. We have shown that in Latin America women's viability (and sometimes victory) as presidential candidates runs through

established political parties. By focusing on viability, we re-centered the centrality of political parties—particularly those with governing experience—in examining women’s access to executive office inspiring our research question: why do established parties nominate a woman for president?

Our answer started with observations that many countries in the region enjoy regime stability, but nevertheless suffer from representational malaise, or deep dissatisfaction with the political ruling class, often driven by corruption scandals, critiques of insular political elites and longing for renewal. Our central argument is that parties facing these critiques are more likely to nominate women for president. This occurs because of associations between the female sex and (1) novelty or change; (2) “feminine” leadership and issue advantages; and (3) enhanced ability to mobilize women voters. Our analysis highlighted how established parties were particularly willing to back female candidates when party elites and activists believed nominating a woman would help them respond to citizens’ representational critiques and maintain power. Our argument expects that established parties perceive little reason to nominate women in contexts where parties face fewer representational critiques, and the analysis of a negative case illustrates how a party in power with comparatively minor citizen discontent saw little reason to bet on a female candidate.

This study presents multiple implications relevant for how women come to govern their countries. The first is that women’s viability as presidential candidates often depends on the support of established parties. For the purposes of this article, we defined “established” parties as all parties and coalitions that had previously governed their country or were directly linked to ones that had, but our gendered incentives theory may apply best to incumbent parties seeking to maintain power. Future research can probe the scope of our



theory in the cases of, for example Peru's Fuerza Popular that had previously governed but was not the incumbent party when it backed Keiko Fujimori in 2011 and 2016. Since 1990, we have also uncovered no instance of a woman forging a viable presidential campaign as an outsider populist, and only one case of a viable woman candidate creating a party from scratch to advance her candidacy. Indeed our theory suggests that women are less likely than men to pursue these alternative pathways to power in Latin America, and future research can test this proposition more broadly in other regions.

Second, we have maintained throughout the paper that a theory of relative success—that is viability—logically precedes a theory of outright presidential victories by female contenders. Our analysis, however, does proffer some ideas about factors that differentiate between wins (Chile, Costa Rica, and Brazil) and almost-wins (Mexico and Paraguay). We suggest that the sitting presidents' popularity could distinguish these cases. Incumbent presidents Lagos, Arias and Lula seemed to enjoy greater popularity than Calderón and Duarte. Future research can further tease out the relationship of incumbent presidents' standing in public opinion on final election results.

A third implication relates to strategies for future female contenders for the Latin American presidency. The links between the presidency and masculinity are hard to dispute, and women seeking the presidency usually must demonstrate qualities typically associated with the male sex in order to be taken seriously as candidates. This study nevertheless implies that, rather than primarily or solely attempting to assimilate to masculine standards of presidentiality, women with such ambitions should consider highlighting their stereotypical comparative advantages, particularly around change, honesty, and more consensual leadership styles. Mobilizing women voters through building

gendered solidarity was also a successful strategy for viable women candidates across the political spectrum.

To close, incentives that established parties have perceived around women's capacity to symbolize novelty and project moral integrity may fade as more women become presidents and some of them are implicated in scandals. Future research can explore the degree to which second-time female presidential candidates or second-term female presidents are able to credibly claim these stereotypically feminine advantages. At what point do citizens start to perceive female and male candidates similarly in terms of signaling novelty or honesty? Women may then begin to leverage different kinds of stereotypical associations in order to level the playing field or they may attempt a different strategy altogether in emphasizing equality with men rather than positive differences.

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<sup>1</sup> We would like to thank Susan Franceschet, Melinda Adams and the two anonymous reviewers for their incisive comments on previous drafts. Their comments significantly strengthened our work. Support was also provided by COES through the CONICYT/FONDAP/15130009 grant.

<sup>2</sup>A.W. Geiger and Lauren Kent, "Number of women leaders around the world has grown, but they're still a small group." Pew Research Center. <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/08/women-leaders-around-the-world/>. According to the IPU, in 2019 women represent only 5.2% of all heads of government, <https://www.ipu.org/resources/publications/infographics/2019-03/women-in-politics-2019>.

<sup>3</sup>Latin American parties and party systems have often been institutionally fluid and historically unstable (see for example, Scott Mainwaring, ed., *Party Systems in Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018; Steven Levitsky, et.al. eds.,

*Challenges of Party-Building in Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016)). However, even given these challenges, parties still possess critical resources needed to launch viable candidacies.

<sup>4</sup>Catherine Reyes-Housholder and Gwynn Thomas, “Latin America’s Presidentas: Challenging Old Patterns, Forging New Pathways,” in Leslie Schwindt-Bayer, ed., *Women, Representation, and Politics in Latin America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 19-38; Diana O’Brien and Catherine Reyes-Housholder, “Women and Executive Politics,” in Rudy B. Andeweg, et al., eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Executives* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Forthcoming).

<sup>5</sup>Patricia Sykes, “Women’s Executive Leadership,” *Government and Opposition*, 51:1 (2016): 160–81; Reyes-Housholder and Thomas; Gretchen Bauer and Manon Tremblay, *Women in Executive Power: A Global Overview* (Routledge: New York, 2011); Georgia Duerst-Lahti and Rita Mae Kelly, *Gender Power, Leadership, and Governance* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).

<sup>6</sup>O’Brien and Reyes-Housholder.

<sup>7</sup>Amy Alexander and Farida Jalalzai, “Symbolic Empowerment and Female Heads of States and Government: A Global, Multilevel Analysis,” *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 39:1 (2018), 1–20; Catherine Reyes-Housholder, “A Constituency Theory for the Conditional Impact of Female Presidents,” *Comparative Politics*, 51:3 (2019), 429-447. Farida Jalalzai and Pedro G. dos Santos, “The Dilma Effect? Women’s Representation under Dilma Rousseff’s Presidency,” *Politics & Gender* 11:1 (2015), 117–145;

<sup>8</sup>Alexander Baturu and Julia Gray, “When Do Family Ties Matter? The Duration of Female Suffrage and Women’s Path to High Political Office,” *Political Research Quarterly*, 71: 3

(2018): 695-709; Farida Jalalzai, *Shattered, Cracked or Firmly Intact? Women and the Executive Glass Ceiling Worldwide* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Michael A. Genovese and Janie S. Steckenrider, eds., *Women as Political Leaders: Studies in Gender and Governing* (New York: Routledge, 2013).

<sup>9</sup>Farida Jalalzai and Meg Rinker, “Blood Is Thicker than Water: Family Ties to Political Power Worldwide,” *Historical Social Research* 43, no. 4 (2018), 54–72; Farida Jalalzai, *Women Presidents of Latin America: Beyond Family Ties?* (New York: Routledge, 2016); Linda Richter, “Exploring Theories of Female Leadership in South and Southeast Asia.” *Pacific Affairs* 63, no. 4 (1993): 524–40.

<sup>10</sup>Claudia Derichs and Mark R. Thompson, *Dynasties and Female Political Leaders in Asia: Gender, Power and Pedigree* (Berlin: LIT Verlag Münster, 2013). Mark R. Thompson, “Presidentas and People Power in Comparative Asian Perspective,” *Philippine Political Science Journal*, 28, no. 51 (2007), 1–32.

<sup>11</sup>Jalalzai and Rinker.

<sup>12</sup>Baturo and Gray; Olle Folke, et. al.. “Gender and Dynastic Political Recruitment” (2017): In [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2985230](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2985230)..

<sup>13</sup>While Bachelet has sometimes been characterized as having family ties (e.g. Jalalzai 2008; 2013), this connection is based on her father, a lieutenant general in the airforce, having served in a low-level position for a short time in the government of Salvador Allende. Chilean specialists do not see Bachelet as having ties to Chile’s powerful political families. See for example Marcela Ríos Tobar, “Feminist Politics in Contemporary Chile: From the Democratic Transition to Bachelet,” in *Feminist Agendas and Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Jane S. Jaquette (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009): 21-44; Gwynn

Thomas, “Michelle Bachelet’s Liderazgo Femenino (Feminine Leadership),” *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 13 no. 1 (2011), 63–82.

<sup>14</sup> CIDOB. Biografías de líderes políticos, 2016: en línea:

[https://www.cidob.org/biografias\\_lideres\\_politicos/america\\_central\\_y\\_caribe/panama/mireya\\_moscoso\\_de\\_arias/\(language\)/esl-ES](https://www.cidob.org/biografias_lideres_politicos/america_central_y_caribe/panama/mireya_moscoso_de_arias/(language)/esl-ES), consulted 17 Dec. 2018

<sup>15</sup>Jennifer Piscopo, “Primera Dama, Prima Donna? Media Constructions of Cristina Fernandez De Kirchner in Argentina,” in Rainbow Murray, ed., *Cracking the Highest Glass Ceiling: A Global Comparison of Women’s Campaigns for Executive Office*, (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010), 197–219.

<sup>16</sup>Frank Thames and Margaret Williams. *Contagious Representation: Women’s Political Representation in Democracies around the World* (New York: New York University Press, 2013).

<sup>17</sup> Jalalzai, 2013; Verónica Montecinos, ed., *Women Presidents and Prime Ministers in Post-Transition Democracies* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2017).

<sup>18</sup>Gary W. Cox and Scott Morgenstern, “Latin America’s Reactive Assemblies and Proactive Presidents,” *Comparative Politics* 33 no. 2 (2001), 171–89.

<sup>19</sup> Karen Beckwith, “Before Prime Minister: Margaret Thatcher, Angela Merkel, and Gendered Party Leadership Contests.” *Politics & Gender* 11 (December 2015), 718–45.

<sup>20</sup> Baturó and Gray, 2018; Jalalzai, 2013; Thames and Williams, 2013.

<sup>21</sup> Rainbow Murray, *Cracking the Highest Glass Ceiling : A Global Comparison of Women’s Campaigns for Executive Office* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010).

<sup>22</sup> O’Brien and Reyes-Housholder.

<sup>23</sup> Catherine Reyes-Housholder and Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, “The Impact of Presidentas on Women’s Political Activity,” in Janet M. Martin and MaryAnne Borrelli, eds., *The Gendered Executive* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2016), 103–23.

<sup>24</sup> One example of this occurred in the 1998 candidacy of Irene Sáez in Venezuela. While initially polling strongly, she finished in third place with only 3% of the vote (Magda Hinojosa, “She’s Not My Type of Blonde”: Media Coverage of Irene Sáez’s Presidential Bid” in Rainbow Murray, ed., *Cracking the Highest Glass Ceiling: A Global Comparison of Women’s Campaigns for Executive Office*, (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010), 31-48.

<sup>25</sup> For work on parliamentary systems in Europe, see Beckwith; Diana O’Brien, “Rising to the Top: Gender, Political Performance, and Party Leadership in Parliamentary Democracies,” *American Journal of Political Science* 59:4 (2015), 1022-39.

<sup>26</sup> Reyes-Housholder and Thomas.

<sup>27</sup> Daniel Zovatto, “Financiamento Dos Partidos e Campanhas Eleitorais Na América Latina: Uma Análise Comparada.” *Opinião Pública* 11:2 (2005), 287–336.

<sup>28</sup> Taylor Boas, *Presidential Campaigns in Latin America: Electoral Strategies and Success Contagion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Mainwaring.

<sup>29</sup> Jana Morgan and Melissa Buice, “Latin American Attitudes toward Women in Politics: The Influence of Elite Cues, Female Advancement, and Individual Characteristics,” *American Political Science Review* 107:04 (2013), 644–62.

<sup>30</sup> Reyes-Housholder and Thomas.

<sup>31</sup> Levitsky, et.al, 11; Juan Pablo Luna, “Chile’s Crisis of Representation,” *Journal of Democracy* 27 no. 3 (2016), 129–38; Alfredo Joignant, et. al, eds., *Malaise Representation*

*in Latin American Countries: Chile, Argentina and Uruguay* (London: Palgrave

Macmillan, 2017).

<sup>32</sup> Joignant, et. al., 2; Carolina Segovia, “Malaise and Democracy in Chile,” in Alfredo Joignant et. al., eds., *Malaise in Representation in Latin America* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 69–92; Rossana Castiglioni and Cristóbal Rovira, “Challenges to Political Representation in Contemporary Chile,” *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 3 no. 1 (2016), 3–24.

<sup>33</sup>Kendall D. Funk, Magda Hinojosa, and Jennifer M. Piscopo, “Women to the rescue: The gendered effects of public discontent on legislative nominations in Latin America,” *Party Politics*, forthcoming, 2019.

<sup>34</sup>Leslie Schwindt-Bayer and Catherine Reyes-Housholder, “Citizen Responses to Female Executives: Is It Sex, Novelty or Both?” *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 5 no. 3 (2017), 1–26; Susan Franceschet, Jennifer M. Piscopo, and Gwynn Thomas. “Supermadres, Maternal Legacies and Women’s Political Participation in Contemporary Latin America.” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 48 no. 1 (2016), 1–32.

<sup>35</sup> Murray.

<sup>36</sup> Thomas, 2011.

<sup>37</sup> Leonie Huddy and Nayda Terkildsen, “Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male and Female Candidates,” *American Journal of Political Science* 37 no.1 (1993), 119–47.

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