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Despite major advances, gender inequalities in public policies continue to plague most democracies.<sup>1</sup> It is widely believed that one way to redress these injustices—and thereby help ensure equal citizenship rights—is to elect more women to political office. Vast research from around the world empirically demonstrates that female politicians are more likely than their male counterparts to act on behalf of women citizens, and the impact of female politicians varies.<sup>2</sup> Most research in this vein examines legislatures, but the stakes are higher for chief executives whose unparalleled political powers can uniquely position them to improve women's historically marginalized status.

Female chief executives have governed for at least one year in over 50 countries worldwide.<sup>3</sup> Some single case studies have documented their uneven pursuit of reforms favoring women citizens. This variation is often explained by psychological idiosyncrasies, personal backgrounds or country-specific factors, and no dominant theory has emerged.<sup>4</sup> A study of female presidents is especially relevant since presidential systems now outnumber parliamentary regimes.<sup>5</sup> Under what conditions do female presidents use their power more than their male counterparts to benefit women?

This article develops a constituency theory for the conditional impact of left-of-center female presidents on pro-women reforms. The theory maintains that female presidents overall are more likely than their male counterparts to act on behalf of women because of gendered differences in their core and personal constituencies. Female presidents are more likely to (1) attempt to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity (core constituency); and (2) network with elite feminists (personal constituency). I nevertheless argue that only presidents who successfully mobilize women voters and extensively network with elite feminists are most likely

to significantly use their power to advance pro-women reforms. Core and personal constituencies function as mechanisms linking presidents' gender identities to their variable promotion of pro-women legislation.

I illustrate this constituency theory with evidence from Latin America where women have democratically won the presidency more times than any other region of the world.<sup>6</sup> I employ a controlled case design in examining the campaigns and first terms of Michelle Bachelet of Chile (2006-10) and Dilma Rousseff of Brazil (2011-15) as well as those of their co-partisan male predecessors. The analysis reveals that both Bachelet and Rousseff attempted to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity to a greater degree than their co-partisan male predecessors. However, only Bachelet succeeded. Moreover, elite feminists in both countries were enthusiastic about electing a female president, and at the same time, Bachelet's personal constituency included many prominent feminists in Chile while Rousseff's included few. I find that only Bachelet possessed bottom-up incentives from core constituents and top-down expertise from personal constituents to pursue pro-women policies.

After establishing these differences in constituencies, the main independent variables of interest, I analyze original datasets capturing pro-women policymaking by these female presidents and their male predecessors. Results concerning their divergent efforts are consistent with the constituency theory's expectations. I then detail ways in which these female presidents' core and personal constituencies help directly account for their different uses of legislative power to fulfill some pro-women promises from their campaigns. The case of Rousseff's predecessor suggests that pro-women proposals may not require both constituency conditions: in some instances ties to elite feminists may suffice. It nevertheless still appears that only presidents with

both kinds of core and personal constituencies specified above are most likely to pursue significant pro-women reforms.

This article contributes by theorizing on female and male presidents' gendered incentives and capacities in deploying their power on behalf of women citizens, a historically marginalized group. I build on the descriptive and substantive representation literatures to clarify the probabilistic mechanisms linking presidents' gender identities to their deployment of power to advance pro-women reforms. This study ultimately provides fresh insights on the benefits and limitations of women's growing presence in office,<sup>7</sup> particularly in Latin America's powerful presidencies.

### **1. The Variable Impact of Female Chief Executives on Pro-Women Reforms**

Research on female chief executives usually examines how these women access power.<sup>8</sup> But what do women do with executive power once they obtain it? Do they pursue change to help other women, members of their own historically marginalized group? To date, differences in female executives' pro-women decision-making seem to depend on idiosyncratic factors. Many point to executives' feminism to explain why some have pushed for significant pro-women change. President Michelle Bachelet of Chile stands out as a paradigmatic example, and many authors attribute her strong promotion of gender equality to her feminist consciousness.<sup>9</sup> Similarly described as a feminist, Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland of Norway also advanced women's interests.<sup>10</sup>

Other studies stress the particularities of female executives' biographies, country contexts or individual psychologies to account for why they promoted little pro-women change. Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff's and German Chancellor Angela Merkel's minimal uses of power to

advance gender equality are traced back to, in the case of Rouseff, her imprisonment and torture during the military dictatorship,<sup>11</sup> and in the case of Merkel, her identity as a Protestant physicist from East Germany.<sup>12</sup> The unique personality of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is thought to drive her decision-making, sometimes characterized as anti-feminist.<sup>13</sup>

Aside from these case studies, cross-national statistical work has examined whether female leaders in Europe and Latin America promote pro-women change by nominating more female ministers.<sup>14</sup> Yet, some studies find that more female ministers does not necessarily result in more policies favoring women, and thus while still important, the consequences of these appointments for women citizens may appear largely symbolic.<sup>15</sup> Any pro-women impact, moreover, may be easily reversed since Latin American ministers on average exit the cabinet after just two years.<sup>16</sup> This article instead studies executives' use of legislative power, which could have more substantive and enduring benefits.

Employing Pitkin's framework of "descriptive" and "substantive" representation,<sup>17</sup> conventional theories on women's policy impact in legislatures account for either inter-gender or intra-gender variation. Concerning the former, female legislators are believed to promote pro-women reforms more than their male counterparts due to gender socialization and women's experiences.<sup>18</sup> The approach pays little attention to causal mechanisms, as it assumes that social constructions of gender directly link legislators' sex with actions on behalf of women.<sup>19</sup> Critical mass theory accounts for intra-gender variation in positing that when female legislators are more numerous, they can better coordinate with each other and thus are more likely to advance pro-women bills.<sup>20</sup> Partisanship theories offer an alternative take on this kind of variation in suggesting that left-leaning women are more likely to promote pro-women reforms.<sup>21</sup> I instead argue that constituencies can help account for both kinds of variation. The next section

specifically will suggest that gendered characteristics of constituencies operate as probabilistic mechanisms linking presidents' gender identities to their use of power to promote pro-women reforms.

## **2. A Constituency Theory for the Conditional Impact of Female Presidents**

Representation and gender scholars have tended to underestimate the potential impact of constituencies on politicians' advancement of pro-women policies. One reason for this is that most of these legislative studies conceptualize constituencies as state-determined, geographically-bound territories. They conclude that politicians' sex matters almost regardless of constituencies' ("the districts'") aggregated preferences and demands.<sup>22 23</sup>

I depart from this literature by disaggregating the concept of presidents' constituencies, which in turn permits theorization of their influence on executive policymaking. "Core" and "personal" constituencies crystallize during presidential campaigns and later can motivate and enable presidents to legislate in certain issue areas. To begin, candidates often seek to discursively unite "core" constituencies of loyalists around a common identity.<sup>24</sup> Properly mobilized, core constituencies create incentives, such as higher approval ratings and brighter re-election prospects, for presidents to use their legislative power to target these mass-level groups.<sup>25</sup>

"Personal" constituents are members of elite, often partisan, networks. These constituents possess the political information (i.e. which affected groups will support or oppose a policy) and technical information (i.e. which policies are feasible and efficient) required for effective policymaking. Once in office, presidents often name personal constituents to their cabinets or

other high-level posts.<sup>26</sup> Personal constituents therefore can supply the expertise that improves presidents' capacity to legislate in a particular issue area.

Presidential candidates' identities as either men or women shape gendered aspects of their core and personal constituencies. Regarding the former, shared identities, such as gender, are believed to facilitate the transfer of political support. Because of female candidates' perceived advantage with women voters, these candidates are more likely than their male counterparts to try to mobilize women on the basis of gender, that is, by evoking women's multiple identities and promising pro-women change. Although candidates sometimes make appeals to "all women," this kind of core constituency in practice is a sub-set of female voters mobilized around identities such as motherhood or potential victims of sexism. If we assume increased attempts augment success rates, female candidates are more likely than their male counterparts to achieve this kind of core constituency. Crucially, not all female presidential contenders do. Only those who have successfully mobilized this constituency during campaigns are more likely to face incentives to pursue pro-women reforms during their administrations.

Concerning personal constituencies, presidents' political networks contain a variable quantity of elite feminists, defined by their social position and previous work to reverse gender inequality. Often party activists, elite feminists by definition prefer to elect more women, and they therefore are more likely to enthusiastically back female candidates. This means that personal constituencies of female candidates are more likely characterized by elite feminist influence than those of male candidates. Elite feminists during campaigns who become future presidents' advisors are well-positioned to later supply political and technical expertise on pro-women policymaking. Once in power, presidents with strong ties to these feminists may name them to ministerial or other high-level posts, and these presidents thereby will have greater

access to pro-women policymaking expertise. This availability of expertise is crucial because the more information presidents have on a particular issue, the more likely they are to legislate on that issue.<sup>27</sup> Therefore, presidents with personal constituencies marked by a stronger feminist presence are more likely to use their power effectively and frequently to advance pro-women legislation.

Figure 1 depicts how candidates' gender identities affect gendered characteristics of core and personal constituencies and hence presidential incentives and capacities to legislate on behalf of sub-sets of women. The links on the left indicate that whether the candidate is a woman alters the likelihood of mobilizing women voters on the basis of gender identity. If winning candidates achieve this kind of core constituency, then as presidents, they will possess greater incentives to pursue pro-women reforms and therefore are more likely to do so.

<INSERT FIGURE 1>

The links on the right show that whether the candidate is a woman also affects the likelihood of networking with elite feminists. If winning candidates maintain these ties, then as presidents, they will have more access to expertise on pro-women policies, and hence a greater capacity advance this kind of legislation. Gendered characteristics of core and personal constituencies help determine the conditions under which female presidents are most likely to leverage their power on behalf of women.

### **3. Case Selection**

The constituency theory may apply best to ideologically progressive presidents. Sub-sets of women voters can be mobilized on the basis of conservative conceptualizations of gender identities, but since feminists have traditionally associated more with the left, their variable

presence in personal constituencies seems most relevant for progressive leaders.<sup>28</sup> This article therefore illustrates the constituency theory with controlled case studies of left-of-center presidents.<sup>29</sup> Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking Latin America is home to 8 of the world's 19 female presidents who have governed for at least a year,<sup>30</sup> and Bachelet appears to have advanced the most pro-women change while others have promoted far less.<sup>31</sup> Of the democratically-elected female presidents, Bachelet, Rousseff and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina maintained center-left ideologies while others are characterized as centrist or center-right.<sup>32</sup>

To analyze the potential role of constituencies on female presidents' tendencies to legislate on pro-women issues, I sought to compare Bachelet to a "most similar" counterpart according to salient co-variates: party's stances on gender, party system, female legislators, formal power, and prior experience. To start, the manifestos of Bachelet's Socialist Party and Rousseff's Workers' Party made a comparable number of gender equality mentions in recent years, and depending on the indicator, anywhere from 20-30% of party leaders are female.<sup>33</sup> Next, multi-party systems, such as those in Chile and Brazil, impose more transactional costs than two-party systems,<sup>34</sup> and both Bachelet and Rousseff had to govern ideologically diverse coalitions with currents of religious conservatism.

Third, the number of female legislators also could impinge on the pro-women decision-making of female presidents as they often must work with Congress to pursue their policy agenda. Women's presence in the lower and upper chambers averaged 10.2% in Chile and 12.3% in Brazil, far below the critical mass threshold.<sup>35</sup> Argentina and Costa Rica boasted 39.5% and 38.6% respectively during Fernández's and Chinchilla's administrations in part because of effective gender quotas. Fourth, women with more formal power also may be more likely to push



for pro-women reforms. Of all the Latin American countries that have democratically elected a female president, Chile and Brazil score the highest (0.68 and 0.60 respectively) for presidents' legislative powers, with the next highest being Argentina (0.47).<sup>36</sup>

Finally, pathways to power could shape pro-women decision-making.<sup>37</sup> Unlike other female presidents, neither Bachelet nor Rousseff had won an election before running for president, and neither leveraged family ties to access this office. Both pioneered women's presence in cabinets. Bachelet was named Health Minister, and then became Latin America's first female Defense Minister, a stereotypically masculine ministry. Rousseff was appointed Mines and Energy Minister and then became Brazil's first Chief of Staff, two other stereotypically masculine posts.<sup>38</sup> Both succeeded popular male co-partisans, Ricardo Lagos of Chile's Socialist Party (PS) and Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva of Brazil's Workers' Party (PT). These female presidencies were comparatively similar in several aspects that are theoretically relevant.<sup>39</sup>

#### **4. How Candidates' Gender Identities Affect Core and Personal Constituencies**

The cases of Bachelet, Rousseff and their co-partisan male predecessors highlight ways in which candidates' gender identities can influence the crystallization of gendered core and personal constituencies during campaigns (see Figure 1's top links). Consistent with the theory, both Bachelet and Rousseff seemed to believe that their shared identities with women could confer electoral advantages with this demographic. They consequently made earlier and greater attempts than their co-partisan male predecessors to mobilize a core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity, but only Bachelet succeeded. Also in line with expectations, many elite feminists in both countries expressed enthusiasm for a potential female president,

suggesting a greater likelihood of them becoming personal constituents of these female candidates than of their male counterparts. Bachelet nevertheless networked much more with feminists than Rouseff prior to assuming office.

*Women voters and core constituencies* During the Chilean elections of 1999-00, Lagos became seriously concerned with the women's vote only after the first round results showed that he had underperformed among this group. He believed that women were more effective than men in mobilizing women, and for that reason, he enlisted a female campaign manager to compensate for his weakness among female voters.<sup>40</sup> This female surrogate tactic did not seem to work as planned.<sup>41</sup> In brief, Lagos made few attempts to galvanize women by evoking women's identities and promising pro-women change, and he subsequently lost the female vote in both rounds. He thereupon as president did not view women mobilized on the basis of gender identity as a core constituency.

Representing the same center-left party in the subsequent elections, Bachelet leveraged mutually held gender identities to appeal to sub-sets of female voters early on and repeatedly throughout her 2005-06 campaign.<sup>42</sup> She started meeting with groups of women and discussing gender discrimination over a year before the election.<sup>43</sup> Emphasizing common experiences with many women voters, she recounted her struggles as a single working mother in interviews. She moreover highlighted multiple, explicitly gendered identities in her closing statements to the November 16, 2005 presidential debate.<sup>44</sup> Pledging positive change for (sub-groups of) women, Bachelet included 42 pro-women proposals in her platform—far more than the nine from Lagos' 1999-00 platform.<sup>45</sup> One of the most prominent included state childcare expansion, which would serve low-income (potential) mothers seeking to work outside the home. Bachelet thus devoted

more effort than Lagos in cultivating a constituency of specific groups of women on the basis of gender identity.

In Brazil, candidates' gender identities also seemed to affect strategies vis-à-vis women voters. Rousseff generally sought to appeal to the same electoral groups that had supported Lula in 2006—namely impoverished voters and left-leaning organizations. She nevertheless departed from her male predecessor by focusing on a demographic that historically had not backed him: women. Like Bachelet, she calculated that leveraging gender identity could help her mobilize a new core constituency of women, specifically those on the left and low-income (potential) mothers. She therefore began to evoke women's identities—such as motherhood—and to promise pro-women change—particularly in the area of maternal health—months before the election season and repeatedly throughout her campaign.

One of the first instances of this occurred in March 2010 when Rousseff spoke to women union workers in the traditional PT bastion of São Paulo in an “act of electoral nature aimed at the female electorate.”<sup>46</sup> This was a logical audience early in the campaign because it represented overlap between one of Lula's core constituencies (unions) and her new target constituency (women). Rousseff's team also launched a “Women with Dilma” site months prior to the election to attract a similar female demographic.<sup>47</sup> The PT convention's “women's” theme was designed to energize female partisans by celebrating Brazilian women.<sup>48</sup> Finally, Rousseff's programmatic emphasis on the health of pregnant women and infants fit well with her maternalist discourse, which she employed throughout her campaign in order to establish shared identity, trust and ultimately votes from women.<sup>49</sup>

Therefore, consistent with the constituency theory, both Bachelet and Rousseff made early and recurrent attempts to solidify female support with gendered discourses and pro-women

pledges—a goal that their co-partisan male predecessors had pursued much less during their campaigns. The theory further stipulates that even though female candidates may *attempt* to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity more than male candidates, they do not always *achieve* this. Evidence from early polls and interviews suggests that Bachelet, but not Rousseff, Lagos or Lula, perceived women as a core constituency. A national survey conducted months prior to the election showed that 51% of Chilean women and 45% of men said they would vote for Bachelet.<sup>50 51</sup> Because Bachelet had energized female loyalists early on, she later sought centrist male votes to clinch the presidency. These later efforts seemed to help narrow her gender gap, and in the first round she ended up with 2% more female than male votes. Bachelet thereby became the first left-leaning presidential candidate in Chilean history to earn more support from women than men.<sup>52</sup>

Interview evidence suggests Bachelet believed she had effectively mobilized a core constituency of women. Being a woman “was a factor that favored me,” she concluded in a post-election interview. “I won all the women’s precincts and I lost in all the men’s precincts.”<sup>53</sup> Even the opposition in Chile admitted that shared gender identity boosted her standing with women. One conservative strategist and congresswoman remarked that “Bachelet has the advantage of conquering the women’s vote because it is very easy for many women to identify with her because of the gender issue.”<sup>54</sup> To conclude, Bachelet reasonably attributed her victory at least in part to her successful, gendered mobilization of a sub-sets of women. This *presidenta* therefore perceived incentives to legislate on behalf of these core constituencies in order to maintain her approval ratings and secure a future (in this case, non-consecutive) re-election.

While the Chilean presidents’ core constituencies differed in gendered ways, Rousseff’s and Lula’s constituencies largely overlapped. Despite Rousseff’s targeting of women, at no

moment during her 2010 campaign did she poll better among women than men. Some analysts even argued that she would have won in the first round, rather than the second, had she performed equally well among female and male voters.<sup>55</sup> I was unable to unearth any evidence of Rousseff, her surrogates or any outside observers claiming a sub-group of women voters as one of her core constituencies.

To further probe sex differences in candidates' constituencies, I built first-round vote choice models for Lagos in 1999, Bachelet in 2005, Lula in 2006 and Rousseff in 2010. Results show that after controlling for possible confounders, being female decreased the likelihood of voting for Lagos, Lula and Rousseff but augmented the likelihood of voting for Bachelet. (See the online appendix for full results.) The statistical estimates, together with the archival and interview evidence, strengthen my argument that only Bachelet could reasonably call a sub-set of women voters mobilized on the basis of gender identity one of her core constituencies.

To sum up, both Bachelet and Rousseff aimed to galvanize female voters by evoking women's identities and pledging pro-women change. However, only Bachelet seemed to perceive success. Rousseff had little reason to ascribe part of her electoral victory to a constituency of women that Lula had not previously mobilized. Brazil's *presidenta* therefore had few incentives to legislate on behalf of women in ways that significantly differed from Lula's legacy.

*Elite feminists and personal constituencies* The constituency theory suggests that elite feminists, enthusiastic about electing a female president, are more likely to serve as personal constituents of viable female rather than male candidates (top right link in Figure 1). Many elite feminists in Chile and Brazil at the time of these elections had organized opposition to their countries' military regimes during the 1980s.<sup>56</sup> Feminists in both countries, eager to elect a

female president, appeared willing and able to act as Bachelet's or Rouseff's personal constituents. However, while Bachelet maintained numerous, strong ties to elite feminists in Chile, Rouseff maintained few relationships with these actors in Brazil.<sup>57</sup>

Chilean leaders of the pro-democracy women's movement included Bachelet's mother; Bachelet's "best" friend, María Estela Ortiz de Parada; as well as congresswoman Carolina Tohá.<sup>58</sup> Elite feminists such as these influenced the candidate and her campaign in diverse ways. One of Bachelet's closest advisers nicknamed "Jupi," Alvarez had marshaled bands of female loyalists to back Bachelet's candidacy before she officially entered the race, and Jupi later managed Bachelet's agenda. As a campaign spokesperson, Tohá publicly defended many of Bachelet's pro-women proposals,<sup>59</sup> and attended high-level campaign meetings along with Jupi.<sup>60</sup> Bachelet eventually named Tohá secretary general of the government, one of the most high-profile ministerial posts in Chile.

The press coined the term "Bachemelenas" to describe other elite feminist supporters, including Teresa Valdés, one of Chile's most respected feminist intellectuals, and Carmen Andrade, later tapped to lead the women's ministry.<sup>61 62</sup> María Soledad Barría, an "avowed feminist,"<sup>63</sup> of the Socialist Party had met Bachelet during their adolescence and had campaigned with her in local races in 1996. Bachelet later named her Health Minister, and Barría helped advance an executive goal of extending availability of emergency contraception to young low-income women. Elite feminists therefore participated in a presidential candidate's personal constituency in ways never before seen in Chile, and many went on to serve in powerful positions in Bachelet's first administration.

Although the constituency theory argues that female candidates are more *likely* to network with elite feminists, Rouseff's case demonstrates that not all female candidates do.

Elite feminists in Brazil hardly engaged in her presidential bid. Although enthused at the prospect of a *presidenta*, feminists both within and outside the PT passionately criticized Rousseff's campaign strategy. Terezinha Vicente, claiming to speak on behalf of all PT feminists, pointed out that Rousseff's maternalist discourse promoted conventional gender norms. She also argued that Lula's paternalistic, dominant role in her campaign reinforced ideas about women's inferiority and need for men. Another prominent feminist, Sueli Oliveira, protested that "we were seen the whole life as mothers, and we do not want just that for women."<sup>64</sup> Many feminists also worried that the Rousseff candidacy missed opportunities to challenge gender stereotypes. These criticisms help explain why many gender equality advocates felt alienated rather than energized by her candidacy.

According to Vicente, almost no feminists had gained access to Rousseff's inner circle, an observation corroborated by my interviews with elite feminists in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Brasília as well as my review of the Brazilian press. Although Rousseff later named her feminist friend Eleonora Menicucci to head the Women's Ministry, she did not wield significant influence compared to other Rousseff advisors.

Many of these non-feminist advisors were holdovers from the Lula administration.<sup>65</sup> Journalist Eliane Cantanhêde noted that Rousseff had failed to cultivate a personal constituency independent of Lula's and described how her most powerful aides originated from the inner core of his administration. "In the campaign, she found a ready team" of Lula loyalists willing and able to advise Rousseff.<sup>66</sup> In short, Rousseff networked little with elite feminists, and was far more influenced by the pre-packaged personal constituency of her predecessor. She eventually named many of them to ministerial or other high-level positions.

## 5. How Gendered Constituencies Influence Pro-Women Policymaking

I have argued that only Bachelet successfully mobilized women on the basis of gender identity (core constituency) and extensively networked with elite feminists (personal constituency) during the campaigns. Her case therefore seemed to feature the right conditions for presidential power deployment to advance significant pro-women reforms. After measuring variation in the dependent variable—presidents’ use of power to advance pro-women legislation—<sup>67</sup>I then will detail how constituencies incentivize and enable presidents to pursue these policies (bottom links in Figure 1).

To begin, I define “pro-women” according to authorities located at the international, national and local levels. This approach, by acknowledging the social construction of women’s interests, avoids the assumption that all women have the same, exogenously given interests.<sup>68</sup> At the international level, the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) broadly defines discrimination against women and provides guidelines on how to rectify this.<sup>69</sup> All Latin American countries, in signing CEDAW, have promised to work towards gender equality. Women’s ministries, namely SERNAM in Chile and SPM in Brazil, define pro-women change at the national level according to each country’s context.<sup>70</sup> Finally, organized women at the societal level continuously debate what kind of legislation advances women’s interests.<sup>71</sup> Together CEDAW, women’s ministries and organized groups of women articulate overlapping but still contested ideas about what reforms actually advance women’s interests.<sup>72 73</sup> Legislation from the president qualifies as pro-women if it echoes a comparable understanding expressed in documentation from at least two of the three authorities.

In part because these actors tend to promote a more progressive than conservative agenda, this three-tier operationalization usually yields legislation inspired by a more progressive



gender ideology. One exception comes from Brazil. Presidential initiatives to set up and expand the Bolsa Família accord with CEDAW's and SPM's goals of providing material assistance to impoverished mothers and therefore qualify as a use of presidential power to advance pro-women reforms. However, some analysts have argued that the program reinforces traditional gender roles,<sup>74</sup> and therefore is conservative or even regressive. Despite exceptions such as this one, this study's dependent variable often maps onto more progressive notions of gender equality, another reason why the constituency theory may apply best to left-of-center presidents.

Latin American presidents legislate primarily by sending bills to Congress, which are fully documented by congressional libraries.<sup>75 76</sup> To measure my dependent variable, I constructed original databases of all pro-women legislation initiated by Bachelet, Lagos, Rousseff and Lula, covering the period of 2000-10 in Chile and 2003-14 in Brazil. The three-tier definition described above guided my identification of pro-women legislation, sent to Congress by these presidents, via Chile's and Brazil's online archives. I drew keywords from the CEDAW treaty and texts from the governments' women's ministries as well as the leading feminist and women's groups in each country. I then evaluated each bill according to the "pro-women" conceptualizations expressed by international, national and societal authorities.

Because these presidents varied in their overall political skill, I focus on a "presidential priorities" indicator. This statistic divides the number of pro-women proposals by the total number of proposals, thereby holding constant the total amount of a president's legislative initiatives. In Chile, while 2% of Lagos' bills aimed to advance pro-women change, 4.3% of Bachelet's did the same. This difference is statistically significant. In Brazil, 2.6% of Lula's legislation promoted pro-women change while almost 3% of Rousseff's did. However, this

difference in Brazilian presidents' priorities is not statistically significant. In short, presidents' sex mattered in Chile, but not in Brazil.<sup>77</sup>

How might gendered differences in these female presidents' core and personal constituencies directly help account for divergences in their pro-women policymaking? I argue that Bachelet's core constituency of low-income mothers helped motivate her prioritization of childcare legislation. Moreover, elite feminists from her personal constituency seemed to provide the expertise necessary to legislate in this issue area. Turning to Brazil, I argue that political missteps characterize Rousseff's use of power to advance maternal health, one of her campaign priorities. The comparative absence of elite feminist influence from her personal constituency seemed to inhibit her ability to legislate effectively, and hence, frequently in this issue area.

To begin, Bachelet seemed to sense urgency in pushing for pro-women reforms during her first year in office. Like any president, she needed to satisfy her electoral bases to maintain her approval ratings and secure a potential re-election. Her first pro-women bill stipulated that mothers rather than male partners receive family benefits for workers contributing to social security and supporting their family.<sup>78</sup> This legislation states her intention to fulfill a promise from the campaign document "100 Days Plan: 36 Commitments."<sup>79</sup> Other measures also delivered material assistance to low-income mothers. Bachelet soon after sent Congress bills to launch and institutionalize "Chile Grows with You."<sup>80</sup> Serving the poorest 40% of households, the program assists children from birth through kindergarten by improving maternity care, building preschools and expanding health services.<sup>81</sup>

These presidential proposals were not only driven by Bachelet's core constituents of low-income mothers, but also were spurred by her feminist personal constituents. Estela Ortiz, one of Bachelet's closest friends, had a long history of fighting for women's rights. According to

Staab’s interviews with Chilean policymakers, Bachelet’s “close friendship to María Estela Ortiz—a preschool teacher and human rights activist who would come to play a leading role in the expansion of childcare services between 2006 and 2010—was cited as a source of inspiration and influence.”<sup>82</sup> Ortiz became the first director of the National Council of Kindergartens, part of the Chile Grows with You program.<sup>83</sup> She therefore emerged as an influential actor behind Bachelet’s legislative initiatives in childcare.

Rousseff’s core and personal constituencies also affected her legislative decision-making. Her core constituencies, as described above, overlapped with Lula’s and did not include sub-sets of women mobilized on the basis of gender identity. Given her incentives to cater to the same groups as Lula had, it therefore is unsurprising that four out of seven of Rousseff’s pro-women proposals built on her predecessor’s pro-women legacy.<sup>84</sup> For example, provisory measure (MP) 561 designated government houses from the My House, My Life program (MCMV) to women in the case of separation or divorce.<sup>85</sup> Many have applauded Rousseff for this pro-women measure, and cited it as a primary example of how she acted on behalf of women.<sup>86</sup> This bill nevertheless entailed much less change compared to Lula’s, which created the MCMV program and stipulated title preference to women—albeit, not specifically in cases of separation or divorce. Thus, one of Rousseff’s most frequently-cited pro-women bills actually was a minor extension of her predecessor’s more ambitious initiative.

The virtual absence of elite feminists from Rousseff’s circle of advisers seemed to hinder her attempts to legislate on issues disproportionately affecting women. About six months after Rousseff’s inauguration, *portaria* 1459—not a presidential but a ministerial initiative—created the Stork Network, which seeks to ensure pre-natal care for low-income (future) mothers. This program immediately elicited criticism from organized women nationwide.<sup>87</sup> Feminists, arguing

that women possessed interests independent of their children's, attacked the program's maternalist components.

Months later, Rousseff sought to advance the Stork Network with MP 557, which required potential beneficiaries to register in a national database.<sup>88</sup> Many feminists feared that the registry would enable the government to discover which women had illegally terminated their pregnancy.<sup>89</sup> Two of Brazil's largest women's organizations—Marcha Mundial das Mulheres and Articulação de Mulheres Brasileiras—voiced their fervent opposition to this use of presidential power.<sup>90</sup> The head of the women's ministry claimed to have not participated in the MP's drafting, which further underscored the controversy among feminists around Rousseff's decision-making.<sup>91</sup> This pressure from feminist and women's group leaders prompted Rousseff to withdraw the MP.

Why did this presidential attempt at pro-women policymaking fail? A lack of available political expertise on pro-women change—often provided by elite feminists in an administration—seemed to prevent Rousseff from successfully legislating in this issue area. She appeared unaware of why some organizations would oppose MP 557. Had Rousseff networked with elite feminists and allowed them greater influence over her maternal health agenda, she may have legislated more effectively, and hence frequently, on behalf of low-income (future) mothers.

## **6. Are Both Constituency Conditions Jointly Necessary? The Case of Lula**

I have shown that Bachelet possessed a core constituency of women mobilized on the basis of gender and a personal constituency with influential feminists while Rousseff had neither. Both kinds of constituency conditions so far appear jointly necessary for left-of-center presidents

to deploy their power to advance significant pro-women change. The case of Lula nevertheless suggests that even absent core constituency incentives, relationships with elite feminists can still facilitate some pro-women policymaking by the president.

Although women did not comprise one of Lula's core constituencies, his deep ties to the PT opened opportunities for party feminists to shape his campaign proposals.<sup>92</sup> Many elite feminists who I interviewed acknowledged Lula's ability to channel at least a handful of their demands.<sup>93</sup> Lula's 2002 "Commitment to Women" reflects this kind of influence. The 15-page document features 29 pro-women proposals, addressing poverty, domestic violence, discrimination in the workplace, health and childcare. The document seems to credit the PT's National Women's Secretary for drafting the proposals.

It is unsurprising that Lula rarely exercised his legislative powers to deliver on the "Commitment to Women" promises given that, unlike Bachelet, he had few electoral incentives from mass-level core constituencies to advance pro-women policies. However, the times that he did pursue such legislation often hint at the influence of PT elite feminists. The document's most prominent and detailed promise was to create a Women's Ministry (SPM) linked to the presidency, and Lula's MP 103 fulfilled this pledge on his inaugural day in 2003. Lula strengthened the new institution via other legislative actions: PL 3959 augmented SPM's technical and managerial team by establishing three sub-secretary positions.<sup>94</sup> Second, MP 483 upgraded SPM's status from secretariat to a full ministry.

In short, even though the constituency theory argues that male presidents are less likely than their female counterparts to network with elite feminists, the Lula case illustrates how those who do so even to some degree are more likely to use their power to advance significant pro-women reforms. This suggests that elite feminists may matter independent of female core

constituents mobilized around gender identities and issues. This article has examined no case of a president who achieved this kind of core constituency, and hence faced bottom-up incentives to pursue pro-women change, but who did not network with feminists and thus lacked elite expertise facilitating pro-women policymaking. This kind of future study could help probe the scope of the constituency theory. Conservative presidents, for example, could mobilize a core constituency of women on the basis of (traditional) gender identities, but they are less likely to incorporate elite feminists into their personal constituencies. If these kinds of presidents nevertheless promote significant pro-women legislation—perhaps policies that materially benefit women but rest on conventional gender norms—then this would cast doubt on the necessity of the feminist ties condition.

## **7. Conclusions**

The potential benefits of more women in office are many, but the prospect of pro-women reforms remains one of the most compelling. The recent rise of female chief executives worldwide has raised many such hopes, and yet the degree to which these women—to a greater extent than their male counterparts—have legislated on behalf of women varies widely. I account for some of this variation in theorizing why and how gendered constituencies function as mechanisms linking presidents' gender identities to their use of power to promote pro-women policies. The article's empirics support the argument that two conditions help determine the degree to which left-of-center presidents will leverage their power on behalf of women: those presidents with (1) core constituencies of women mobilized on the basis of gender identity; and (2) personal constituencies featuring elite feminists. Presidents who network with elite feminists

and yet do not perceive this kind of core constituency may also legislate on behalf of women in a less significant way.

This article encourages a shift in scholarly focus away from idiosyncratic factors to a more systematic theorization of the conditional relationship between female chief executives and policies benefitting women. Explanations stressing the role of feminist consciousness often turn tautological in suggesting that, for example, Bachelet legislated on behalf of women because of her feminist consciousness, but she simultaneously is described as feminist because she promoted gender equality. The constituency theory avoids this kind of tautology by examining how constituencies crystallize during campaigns, that is, before presidents assume office, and then tracking how those gendered constituencies later supplied bottom-up incentives and enhanced capacity to advance pro-women legislation.

The theory still allows for the possibility of feminist ideology to indirectly influence presidents' pro-women decision-making. Bachelet may have held stronger feminist beliefs than Rousseff, and a possible consequence of this may have been Bachelet's increased interactions with elite feminists prior to running for president. These relationships may have enabled her successful, gendered mobilization of key sub-sets of women voters. Yet, while candidates' feminism could reasonably influence gendered aspects of her constituencies, it is these constituencies themselves that exert a more direct impact on the degree to which presidents legislate on behalf of women.

The constituency theory not only challenges some of the conventional wisdom in pointing out that gender consciousness may only play an indirect role: it further suggests that presidents' own feminism is insufficient, and at times, possibly irrelevant. The theory posits that even feminist presidents—female or male—require the core constituency incentives and personal

constituency expertise in order to deploy their power effectively and frequently to advance pro-women reforms. It follows that non-feminist presidents will still likely legislate on behalf of women as long as they possess the right kind of core and personal constituencies that motivate and enable such policymaking.

To close, insights from the constituency theory may apply to other political officeholders, especially lower-level executives, such as governors and mayors. A focus on constituency influence moreover may help illuminate some inter- and intra-gender variation for legislators. Like presidents, legislators generally depend on core constituent support for electoral survival, and most scholarship suggests both kinds of policymakers use their power to cater to core constituents.<sup>95</sup> Legislators also rely on the expertise of personal constituents to craft and promote their bills. However, presidents' and legislators' constituencies differ in size and heterogeneity potentially producing divergences in their policy focus. Due to their smaller, more narrow core constituencies, legislators often work on "niche" issues that may reflect their own knowledge, and as a result, they may rely less on personal constituents to supply political and technical information. Presidents, on the other hand, often deal with more complex and far-reaching legislation, such as social security, health care and taxation, and in turn, may depend more on personal constituents.

The constituency theory nevertheless would have more difficulty explaining decision-making by members of cabinets and judiciaries since they frequently are appointed rather than elected. Ministers, are not ultimately responsible to core constituents, but rather the president, and judges tend to be more insulated from public pressures. Future research can further probe the necessity of both constituency conditions, the theory's ideological scope, as well as its generalizability to sub-national and legislative offices.



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<sup>2</sup> Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, *Political Power and Women's Representation in Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Raghavendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo, "Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India," *Econometrica* 72, (July 2004), 1409–43; Kathleen A. Bratton and Leonard P. Ray, "Descriptive Representation, Policy Outcomes, and Municipal Day-Care Coverage in Norway," *American Journal of Political Science* 46, (April, 2002); Susan J. Carroll, *The Impact of Women in Public Office* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001); Sandra Grey, "Does Size Matter? Critical Mass and New Zealand's Women MPs," *Parliamentary Affairs* 55, (January, 2002), 19–29; Susan Franceschet and Jennifer M. Piscopo, "Gender Quotas and Women's Substantive Representation: Lessons from Argentina," *Politics & Gender* 4, (September, 2008), 393–425; Debra Dodson, *The Impact of Women in Congress* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Lena Wängnerud, "Testing the Politics of Presence: Women's Representation in the Swedish Riksdag," *Scandinavian Political Studies* 23, (March, 2000), 67–91.

<sup>3</sup> Abigail Geiger and Lauren Kent. 2017. "Number of Women Leaders around the World Has Grown, but They're Still a Small Group." *Pew Research Center*. March 8. <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/08/women-leaders-around-the-world/>.

<sup>4</sup> Farida Jalalzai, *Women Presidents of Latin America: Beyond Family Ties?* (New York: Routledge, 2016); Michael A. Genovese and Janie S. Steckenrider, eds., *Women as Political Leaders: Studies in Gender and Governing* (New York: Routledge, 2013); Louise K. Davidson-Schmich, "Afterword," *German Politics* 20, (September, 2011): 464–68; Angelika Von Wahl, "A 'Women's Revolution from Above'? Female Leadership, Intersectionality, and Public Policy under the Merkel Government," *German Politics* 20, (September, 2011), 392–409; Georgina Waylen, *Gender, Institutions and Change in Bachelet's Chile* (New York: Palgrave, 2016); Blema S. Steinberg, *Women in Power: The Personalities and Leadership Styles of Indira Gandhi, Golda Meir, and Margaret Thatcher* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 2008); Farida Jalalzai and Pedro G. dos Santos, "The Dilma Effect? Women's Representation under Dilma Rousseff's Presidency," *Politics & Gender* 11, (March 2015), 117–145; Gretchen Bauer and Manon Tremblay, *Women in Executive Power: A Global Overview* (New York: Routledge, 2011); Verónica Montecinos, *Women Presidents and Prime Ministers in Post-Transition Democracies* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2017).

<sup>5</sup> David J. Samuels and Matthew S. Shugart. 2010. *Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior*. Cambridge University Press.

<sup>6</sup> Jalalzai, 2016.

<sup>7</sup> Suzanne Dovi, "Preferable Descriptive Representatives: Will Just Any Woman, Black, or Latino Do?," *American Political Science Review* 96, (December, 2002), 729–43; Jane Mansbridge, "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent 'Yes,'" *The Journal of Politics* 61, (August, 1999).

<sup>8</sup> Frank Thames and Margaret Williams. *Contagious Representation: Women's Political Representation in Democracies around the World*. (New York: New York University Press, 2013); Karen Beckwith, "Before Prime Minister: Margaret Thatcher, Angela Merkel, and Gendered Party Leadership Contests," *Politics & Gender* 11, (December, 2015), 718–45; Jalalzai, Farida, "Women Rule: Shattering the Executive Glass Ceiling." *Politics & Gender* 4 (June, 2008), 1–27.

<sup>9</sup> Waylen, 2016.

<sup>10</sup> Sarah L. Henderson. "Gro Harlem Brundtland of Norway," in *Women as Political Leaders*, Michael A. Genovese and Janie S. Steckenrider, eds. (London: Sage, 2013), 43–79.

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- <sup>11</sup> Fiona Macaulay. "Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016): A Crisis of Governance and Consensus in Brazil," in Verónica Montecinos, ed. *Women Presidents and Prime Ministers in Post-Transitional Contexts*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2017), 123-40.
- <sup>12</sup> Davidson-Schmich, 2011; Von Wahl, 2011.
- <sup>13</sup> Steinberg, 2008; Genovese and Steckenrider, 2013.
- <sup>14</sup> Diana Z. O'Brien et al., "Letting Down the Ladder or Shutting the Door: Female Prime Ministers, Party Leaders, and Cabinet Ministers," *Politics and Gender* 11, (December 2015), 689–717; Catherine Reyes-Housholder, "Presidentas Rise: Consequences for Women in Cabinets?," *Latin American Politics and Society*, 58 (July, 2016), 3-25.
- <sup>15</sup> Maria C. Escobar-Lemmon, Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson, and Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer. "Representing Women: Empirical Insights from Legislatures and Cabinets in Latin America," in Maria C. Escobar-Lemmon and Michelle A. Taylor-Robinson, eds. *Representation: The Case of Women*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
- <sup>16</sup> Maria Escobar-Lemmon and Michelle Taylor-Robinson, "Getting to the Top: Career Paths of Women in Latin American Cabinets," *Political Research Quarterly* 62, (December, 2009), 686.
- <sup>17</sup> Hanna Fenichel Pitkin. *The Concept of Representation*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).
- <sup>18</sup> Nancy Burns and Kay Lehman Schlozman, *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Sue Thomas, *How Women Legislate* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
- <sup>19</sup> Michele L. Swers, *The Difference Women Make: The Policy Impact of Women in Congress* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).
- <sup>20</sup> Sarah Childs and Mona Lena Krook, "Critical Mass Theory and Women's Political Representation," *Political Studies* 56, (October, 2008): 725–36.
- <sup>21</sup> Tracy L. Osborn, *How Women Represent Women: Political Parties, Gender, and Representation in the State Legislatures*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Swers, 2002.
- <sup>22</sup> Kathleen A. Bratton and Kerry L. Haynie, "Agenda Setting and Legislative Success in State Legislatures: The Effects of Gender and Race," *The Journal of Politics* 61, (August, 1999), 658–79; Jessica C. Gerrity, Tracy Osborn, and Jeanette Morehouse Mendez, "Women and Representation: A Different View of the District?" *Politics & Gender* 3, (June, 2007), 179–200.
- <sup>23</sup> Surveys show that female legislators, more than their male counterparts, prioritize female constituents in Latin America (Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). Scholars have yet to integrate evidence on gendered differences in female and male politicians' constituencies into a more general theory of how this could explain variation between female and male politicians and among female politicians.
- <sup>24</sup> Richard Fenno, *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* (New York: Pearson, 1978).
- <sup>25</sup> Douglas L. Kriner and Andrew Reeves, "Presidential Particularism and Divide-the-Dollar Politics," *American Political Science Review* 109, (February, 2015), 155–171.
- <sup>26</sup> Octavio Amorim Neto, "The Presidential Calculus Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas," *Comparative Political Studies* 39, (May, 2006), 415–40; Reyes-Housholder, 2016.
- <sup>27</sup> Paul Light. *The President's Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

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<sup>28</sup> Section 5 will show how my three-tier operationalization of pro-women reforms also in practice tends to, but does not always, reflect more progressive rather than conservative ideologies.

<sup>29</sup> This inductive research design does not formally test the theory or eliminate all possible rival explanations, two goals better suited for cross-national statistics or an experimental approach.

<sup>30</sup> Pamela Paxton and Melanie M. Hughes, *Women, Politics, and Power: A Global Perspective* (Los Angeles: CQ Press, 2016).

<sup>31</sup> Waylen, 2016; Jalalzai, 2016.

<sup>32</sup> María Victoria Murillo, Virginia Oliveros, and Milan Vaishnav, “Electoral Revolution or Democratic Alternation?,” *Latin American Research Review* 45, (3, 2010), 87–114.

<sup>33</sup> Morgan, Jana, and Magda Hinojosa. “Women in Political Parties: Seen But Not Heard.” In *Gender and Representation in Latin America*, edited by Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer. (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

<sup>34</sup> Strøm, Kaare, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman, eds. *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

<sup>35</sup> Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Women in Parliaments: World and Regional Averages,” 2016; Childs and Krook, 2008

<sup>36</sup> J. Mark Payne, *Democracies in Development: Politics and Reform in Latin America* (Cambridge: IDB, 2007).

<sup>37</sup> Davidson-Schmich, 2011; Genovese and Steckenrider, 2013.

<sup>38</sup> Mona Lena Krook and Diana Z. O’Brien, “All the President’s Men? The Appointment of Female Cabinet Ministers Worldwide,” *The Journal of Politics* 74, (July 2012), 840–855.

<sup>39</sup> Moreover, Brazil had a much larger, more organized women’s movement than in Chile (Jaquette, 2009), an observation that strengthens my argument on the importance of gendered constituencies for presidents’ pro-women decision-making.

<sup>40</sup> Arturo Arriagada and Patricio Navia, “Jefes de Campaña En Elecciones Presidenciales En Chile, 1970-2005,” Documentos de Trabajo ICSO, 12 (2005); *La Tercera*, December 15, 1999.

<sup>41</sup> Gender gaps are calculated using official electoral results given that until 2010, Chilean men and women voted at different precincts.

<sup>42</sup> Marcela Ríos Tobar, “Seizing a Window of Opportunity: The Election of President Bachelet in Chile,” *Politics & Gender* 4, (September 2008), 509–19; Mauricio Morales Quiroga, “La Primera Mujer Presidenta de Chile: ¿Qué Explicó El Triunfo de Michelle Bachelet En Las Elecciones de 2005-2006?,” *Latin American Research Review* 43, (1, 2008), 7–32.

<sup>43</sup> *El Mercurio*, April 4, 2004; *The Santiago Times*, April 12, 2004..

<sup>44</sup> Archivo Chile, “Transcripción Completa Del Debate Presidencial Televisado Entre Michelle Bachelet, Sebastián Piñera, Tomás Hirsch Y Joaquín Lavín,” November 16, 2005.

<sup>45</sup> Michelle Bachelet, “Estoy Contigo: Programa de Gobierno Michelle Bachelet 2006-2010,” October 18, 2005; “Programa de Gobierno de Ricardo Lagos: Para Crecer con Igualdad,” *Archivo Chile*, 1999.

<sup>46</sup> *Folha De S. Paulo*, March 26, 2010.

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<sup>47</sup> *Folha De S. Paulo*, March 9, 2010.

<sup>48</sup> *Folha De S. Paulo*, June 14, 2010.

<sup>49</sup> Teresinha Maria de Carvalho Cruz Pires, “A Construção da Imagem Política de Dilma Rousseff como Mãe do Povo Brasileiro,” *Revista Debates* 5, (June 30, 2011), 139.

<sup>50</sup> Centro de Estudios Públicos, “Encuesta CEP,” *www.cepchile.cl*, 2006 1999.

<sup>51</sup> Margin of error was 2.7%.

<sup>52</sup> Ríos Tobar, 2008.

<sup>53</sup> *El Mercurio*, December 25, 2005, Archivo Chile.

<sup>54</sup> *Inter Press Service News Agency*, February 9.

<sup>55</sup> José Alves, Céli Pinto, and Fátima Jordão, eds. *As Mulheres Nas Eleições de 2010*. (Brasília: Secretaria de Políticas para as Mulheres, 2012).

<sup>56</sup> Marcela Ríos Tobar, Lorena Godoy Catalán, and Elizabeth Guerrero Caviedes. *¿Un Nuevo Silencio Feminista? La Transformación de Un Movimiento Social En El Chile Post Transición*. (Santiago de Chile: Cuarto Propio, 2004).

<sup>57</sup> It is beyond the scope of this study to explain why Bachelet networked more with elite feminists, but a few possibilities include Bachelet’s stronger gender consciousness or the influence of Bachelet’s feminist mother. Prior to entering national politics, Rousseff associated more with the Marxist left than feminist circles in Brazil.

<sup>58</sup> Patricio Acevedo, “Graciela Borquez, Dirigente de Las Mujeres DC: ‘Sí, va a Caer, Palabra de Mujer,’” *Archivo Chile*, April 1, 1986, 44; Lidia Baltra Montaner, *Señora presidenta: mujeres que gobiernan países* (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Mare Nostrum, 2006), 40.

<sup>59</sup> *La Tercera*, August 4, 2005.

<sup>60</sup> *La Tercera*, December 11, 2005.

<sup>61</sup> *La Segunda*, March 30, 2013.

<sup>62</sup> Feminist and women’s groups are not as influential as they were during the fight against authoritarian regimes in Chile and Brazil (Jaquette, 2009, 6), and they played a minimal role in every election from 1999-2010 in Chile and Brazil. As this article suggests, some feminists and women’s organization leaders were enthusiastic about women gaining ground in politics, and many individually supported Bachelet’s and—to a much lesser extent—Rousseff’s presidential bids, but neither candidate enjoyed unified support from a women’s movement.

<sup>63</sup> Waylen, 2016, pg. 8.

<sup>64</sup> *Caros Amigos*, June 18, 2010.

<sup>65</sup> *O Globo*, August 8, 2010; *O Globo*, August 13, 2010.

<sup>66</sup> *Folha De S. Paulo*, November 14, 2010.

<sup>67</sup> This study is less focused on pro-women outcomes, which depend on myriad other factors.

<sup>68</sup> Karen Beckwith, “Interests, Issues, and Preferences: Women’s Interests and Epiphenomena of Activism,” *Politics & Gender* 7, (September, 2011), 424–29.

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<sup>69</sup> Lisa Baldez, “The UN Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW): A New Way to Measure Women’s Interests,” *Politics & Gender* 7, (September, 2011), 419–23.

<sup>70</sup> Ann E. Towns, *Women and States: Norms and Hierarchies in International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

<sup>71</sup> Lisa Baldez, *Why Women Protest: Women’s Movements in Chile* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Susan Franceschet, *Women and Politics in Chile* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005).

<sup>72</sup> Catherine Reyes-Housholder, “Presidential Power, Partisan Continuity and Pro-Women Change in Chile: 2000–10,” in Janet M. Martin and MaryAnne Borrelli, eds. *The Gendered Executive*. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2016), 229–249.

<sup>73</sup> Deferring to these international, national and societal authorities’ conceptualization of pro-women reforms avoids pre-selecting issues, a common approach in existing studies (Mala Htun, *Sex and the State: Abortion, Divorce, and the Family under Latin American Dictatorships and Democracies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

<sup>74</sup> Lena Lavinas, Personal Interview. March 6, 2015, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

<sup>75</sup> Peter M. Siavelis, *The President and Congress in Postauthoritarian Chile: Institutional Constraints to Democratic Consolidation* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2000); Marcus André Melo and Carlos Pereira, *Making Brazil Work: Checking the President in a Multiparty System* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

<sup>76</sup> This operationalization of presidents’ deployment of legislative power necessarily excludes informal exercises of power such as attempts to persuade the public, Congress or other officials to support particular policies.

<sup>77</sup> These results confirm case studies showing that Bachelet promoted significant pro-women reforms (Waylen, 2016). However, the results also challenge other interview-based studies suggesting that Rousseff also promoted significant pro-women reforms (Jalalzai and dos Santos 2015). This article’s archival-based approach presents important advantages over existing approaches. First, I compared each of these female presidents against the baseline of their co-partisan male predecessors. Moreover, examining government records rather than elite interviews enhances analytical objectivity. Conclusions about the Rousseff administration that primarily draw from interviews risk selection bias: many interviewees, particularly those who worked in the administration, often have an interest in exaggerating the female president’s pro-women legacy.

<sup>78</sup> Presidente, “Regula El Derecho de La Madre ...,” Pub. L. No. Boletín 4204-13 (2006); Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, “Historia de La Ley N 20.172,” February 16, 2007, 15, 9.

<sup>79</sup> *Radio Cooperativa*, December 27, 2005.

<sup>80</sup> Presidente, “Modifica Normas...,” Pub. L. No. Boletín 4812-13 (2007).

<sup>81</sup> Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, “Historia de La Ley 20.203,” August 3, 2007, 4–10.

<sup>82</sup> Silke Staab, “Opportunities and Constraints for Gender-Egalitarian Policy Change: Michelle Bachelet’s Social Protection Agenda (2006–10),” in Georgina Waylen, ed. *Gender, Institutions and Change in Bachelet’s Chile*. (New York: Palgrave, 2016), 172.

<sup>83</sup> Loreto Amunátegui was tapped to lead the *Integra* foundation, a childcare service also improved by the Chile Grows with You program. Amunátegui qualifies as an elite feminist given her previous efforts to advance gender equality. Staab’s interviews with Ortiz and Amunátegui in 2011 provide further evidence that this childcare legislation targeted mothers, some of Bachelet’s core constituents, seeking formal employment.

<sup>84</sup> Her first pro-women bill—MP 521—was identical to Lula’s MP 536, which he had issued at the end of his second term.

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<sup>85</sup> Presidência da República, “Altera as Leis No 12.409...,” Pub. L. No. Medida Provisória 561 (2012).

<sup>86</sup> Jalalzai, 2016; Jalalzai and dos Santos, 2015.

<sup>87</sup> Conceição Lemes, “Fátima Oliveira: Governo Dilma Submete Corpo Das Brasileiras Ao Vaticano” (Viomundo, January 5, 2012).

<sup>88</sup> Presidência da República, “Institui O Sistema Nacional de Cadastro...,” Pub. L. No. Medida Provisória 557 (2011).

<sup>89</sup> Conceição Lemes, “Telma Negrão: Compromissos Assumidos Pelo Ministério Da Saúde Com a Rede Feminista de Saúde Não São Cumpridos” (Viomundo, July 31, 2011).

<sup>90</sup> “Entidades Feministas Repudiam MP Do Nascituro” (Viomundo, January 14, 2012).

<sup>91</sup> Conceição Lemes, “Ministra Iriny Lopes: A Secretaria de Mulheres Não Teve Nenhuma Participação Na MP 557” (Viomundo, January 12, 2012).

<sup>92</sup> Differences in Lula’s and Rousseff’s career trajectories help explain why Lula seemed to have stronger or more extensive ties to elite feminists than Rousseff. Lula helped found the PT in 1980, after which he emerged as the party’s leader. Feminists from the PT and were enthusiastic about Lula’s 2002 victory in part because as a candidate he had subscribed to numerous pro-women proposals. Indeed feminists potentially were even more enthusiastic than in 2010. In contrast to Lula, Rousseff affiliated with Marxism, later worked in sub-national bureaucracies, and entered the PT only in 2000. Rousseff had a longer history in the Democratic Workers Party (PDT), and she therefore seemed to have fewer or weaker ties to elite feminists within the PT.

<sup>93</sup> Vera Soares, Personal Interview. June 23, 2015, São Paulo, Brazil; Hildete Pereira, Personal Interview, January 26, 2015, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Conceição Nascimento, Personal Interview, May 16, 2015, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

<sup>94</sup> Poder Executivo, “Dispõe Sobre a Criação de Cargos Em Comissão Do Grupo-Direção E Assessoramento Superiores - DAS, Destinados À Secretaria Especial de Políticas Para as Mulheres.,” Pub. L. No. Projeto de Lei 3959 (2008).

<sup>95</sup> Kriner and Reeves, 2015.